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Abstract 
 
Title of Dissertation:         Application of Risk-Based Decision Making on 
Planning VTS 
 
Degree:                              MSc 
 
The dissertation is a study of the methodologies of applying risk-based decision-
making (RBDM) on planning VTS, under the framework of Formal Safety 
Assessment (FSA) recommended by IMO.   
 
The concept of safety and risk as well as their relationship is introduced and 
discussed. A brief look is taken at the traditional and risk-based approaches to 
decision-making in terms of their concepts, principles, and comparison so that the 
advantages and necessity of RBDM to maritime safety are highlighted. With the 
presentation of the concept and principle of VTS, the significance of FSA on 
planning VTS is specified. The problem under analysis and its boundaries related to 
planning VTS is defined and a model for identifying a list of risks and hazards with 
associated scenarios, prioritized by risk level, is introduced. After some 
recommended models were examined, new methods based on the risk index theory 
are demonstrated in order to practically estimate the risk level and determine risk 
acceptability for planning VTS. Then, for uncovering the underlying factors of traffic 
accidents, the m-SHEL model and a new model based on the Reason model, which 
are especially suitable for specifying the relevant risk control options in the context 
of waterways management, are presented. The cost-benefit analysis for a 
prioritisation of the risk control options is elaborated in order to determine whether to 
implement the options. The dissertation concludes with an emphasis on the 
importance of RBDM on planning VTS, and gives a number of suggestions aimed at 
the further promotion of a proactive policy on planning VTS. 
KEYWORDS: Safety, Risk Assessment, FSA, VTS, Decision-making  
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Introduction 
 
Due to the development of larger and less manoeuvrable ships, the increasing traffic 
volume, dangerous cargoes and the potential for environmental pollution, 
establishing a VTS to reduce these risks, as a valid measure, has been a practical 
solution in many ports and waterways around the world. The number of VTS 
systems worldwide has increased rapidly during the last two decades and there are 
now about 500 of these services available in total. In particular, with the recent 
booming seaborne trade and reinforced awareness of a friendly marine environment, 
the implementation of new VTS and the re-assessment of an existing VTS worldwide 
are reaching a new high tide. However, constructing a VTS is a considerable 
investment and its subsequent operation is also very money-consuming. 
Consequently, how to plan a VTS perfectly, which will result in fulfilling its 
functions validly, contributing in reaching its purposes to the greatest extent as 
envisaged, and establishing whether the investment required is justified, are key 
considerations faced by each VTS stakeholder. 
 
Risk-based decision-making (RBDM) has become a hot topic recently in industry 
and government, and the maritime community is no exception. The need for RBDM 
in maritime policy is obvious, as the resources that the public and private sectors can 
devote to navigational safety, traffic efficiency and environmental protection are 
finite. If these limited resources are spent dealing with low-risk problems at the 
expense of high-risk ones, then the industry will be exposed to higher risks that 
cannot be withstood due to an imbalance in resources distribution. The application of 
RBDM in the maritime sector could remedy these situations. It provides a powerful 
tool that can help ensure that limited public and private resources are allocated more 
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effectively to reducing risks, maximizing the protection of maritime safety and the 
environment as well as increasing traffic efficiency.  
 
The traditional approach to safety in the maritime sector has been reactive - to react 
to problems as they occur. Instead of reacting in an ad hoc way to a problem, a 
careful analysis of the risk situation should be carried out while keeping financial and 
resource constraints in mind, which is of special importance to the concerned 
stakeholders and decision-makers. So in order to lower risks rationally as much as 
possible, it is suggested that when planning a VTS, decision-makers should use 
proactive methods, which could be the application of the principle of risk-based 
decision-making on maritime fields.  
 
A practical framework recommended by IMO for RBDM on maritime fields is 
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA). This gives decision-makers a clearer insight into 
the policy and a trustworthy platform on which they form policies and can assist 
them to evaluate the rationality, necessity and cost-effectiveness of a marine project. 
So it is very useful and significant to do the research concerning the application of 
FSA, a framework of RBDM on the maritime sector, when planning for a VTS. 
 
This dissertation outlines a process for developing an evaluation tool to be used as 
the basis for a systematic approach for planning VTSs. The main issues are 
illustrated through a detailed case study, the Wuhan Port in China, which 
demonstrates the large range of an area that can be tackled successfully using several 
newly introduced approaches in the framework of FSA. Thus, the objectives of this 
paper are: 
 
• To determine the factors to be taken into account when considering VTS and 
identify the suitable currently used risk assessment and cost/benefit analysis methods 
and models for planning VTS. 
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• To provide decision-makers with useful tools and references for the planning of a 
new VTS or the re-assessment of an existing VTS, for the purpose of achieving the 
ultimate goals of marine safety and environmental protection as well as efficient 
traffic. 
 
• To develop comprehensive marine traffic risk assessment models in order to assess 
the adequacy and efficiency of the existing mitigation and control systems, develop 
supplementary measures to tackle the risks, if required, establish a basis for deciding 
the implementation of measures which can reduce the risk in planned area, as well as 
form a basis for prioritising the individual risk control options. 
 
As a matter of fact, the work to identify, analyse and manage maritime risks for a 
planned VTS area is generally vast, and it is not possible within such a short paper to 
present all the necessary information in detail. However, the author tries to present a 
quick and fresh look at maritime risks and the need for analysis with a focus on a 
large area. The result of this study could be useful for those concerned with the 
planning of large maritime projects or waterways management. In this sense, this 
work could also be a complementary tool in developing a comprehensive, structured 
and systematic decision-making process for the maritime field.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
  
Risk-based Decision-making in Planning for a VTS 
 
The purpose of a Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) is to improve the maritime safety and 
efficiency of navigation, safety of life at sea and the protection of the marine 
environment and/or the adjacent shore area, work sites and offshore installations 
from the possible adverse effects of marine traffic in a given area (IALA, 2002). Its 
performance regarding these aspects greatly depends on the rationality, justifiability 
and cost-effectiveness related to planning such a large maritime project. 
 
This chapter will introduce the basic concepts of safety and risk as well as their 
relationship. The traditional approach to making decisions concerning maritime 
safety will be re-examined, then the concept of risk-based decision-making will be 
introduced and examined with the aim of identifying its advantages and necessity for 
marine safety. Next, the concept and principle of VTS will be presented, and the 
significance of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), a framework for RBDM 
recommended by IMO, on planning VTS will be specified. 
 
1.1 Safety and risk    
 
Safety was not considered to be a matter of public concern in ancient times, when 
accidents were regarded as inevitable or as the will of the gods. The modern notion 
of safety was developed only in the 19th century as an outgrowth of the industrial 
revolution, when a terrible toll from industrial accidents aroused humanitarian 
concern for their prevention (Pillay & Wang, 2004). Today safety is of deep concern 
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to the whole of human society and has become the province of the public and private 
sectors.  
 
The term “safety” is discussed widely in literature from different perspectives and its 
definition is interpreted variously. For instance, safety is defined in the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary, as “freedom from danger”, while Kuo C. (1998) interprets: safety 
is “perceived quality that determines to what extent the management, engineering 
and operation of a system is free of danger to life, property and the environment”. 
Although safety has different definitions, a generally accepted view of safety could 
thus be embodied from these definitions: absolute safety is not available and there is 
always room for achieving more freedom from danger (Kuo, 1998). 
 
Similarly, the term of risk is mentioned in different contexts, by different scholars, 
and is defined in different literary expressions. For instance, the US 
Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
(1997) defines risk as “the probability of a specific outcome, generally adverse, 
given a particular set of conditions”; Warner (1992) proposes a definition with two 
factors: “risk is a combination of the probability, or frequency, of occurrence of a 
defined hazard and the magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence” (Warner 
1992 cited in Jones and Hood 1996).  
 
No matter how risk is defined, there is a consensus in realistic society: zero risk does 
not exist and what people can do is to reduce the risk to the level toward which they 
can be satisfied. This level is related to human risk perceptions, which could vary 
with different individuals, or different circumstances. For example, the public has 
become accustomed to thousands of fatalities caused by car accidents annually, 
however it cannot tolerate an incident such as the “Prestige” occurring again. 
 
Having examined the meaning of safety and risk, the relation between them would be 
easy to figure out. According to the definition of risk, people could show the extent, 
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to which the system presents danger to life, property and the environment, by risk. 
Consequently, safety could also be expressed by risk in the reverse direction: higher 
risk, less safety; lower risk, more safety. Thus just like what could be drawn from the 
popular definition of safety “safety is a state where the level of risk has been 
reduced to a baseline of as low as reasonably practicable”, it is feasible and 
reasonable to improve safety by controlling and reducing risks. 
 
In addition, safety is an abstract term, while the term of risk is more concrete and can 
be qualified and quantified by various means. It is therefore practical to represent 
safety by means of risk and improve safety by managing risks (Xie, 2001).  
 
1.2 Traditional approach to making decisions concerning maritime safety     
 
Rob Dixon (2003) states in his book that “decision-making, which lies at the heart of 
management, is a process of thought and action that leads to a decision”. Managers 
spend their time choosing between alternative courses of action on the basis of the 
information available to them at the time. Since the first wooden canoe of primitive 
build challenged the vast oceans and seas, the marine industry has always been 
regarded as a risky business, accordingly people have been struggling with 
mitigation of marine risk and improving maritime safety constantly through history 
in order to maintain and promote this indispensable industry to world trade, while 
decision-makers have also been developing relevant marine policies to achieve the 
above attempts.   
 
The traditional approach to making decisions concerning marine safety is based on 
“learning from experiences”, the essence of which is that what people learn and 
accumulate from past experiences predominates over their decision-making process 
and outcomes. It is a typically reactive method; Figure 1 illustrates the basic 
principle of this approach.   
 
6 
An old example of this approach is the Titanic incident: after this disastrous casualty 
people realized the importance of sufficient lifesaving equipment and damage 
stability, so that the decision to create a new Convention (SOLAS, 1914) was made. 
A recent example is the introduction of double-hull tankers: people drew lessons 
from severe oil pollution accidents such as the Exxon Valdez accident in 1989 and 
the Prestige accident in 2002 etc. and stipulated marine policies to phase out single-
hull tankers.     
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Draw lesson, 
and change 
Review
Fail 
Do according 
to experience
New  
experience 
Failure mode 
Reinforce/confirm 
old experience 
 
Succeed 
Do according 
to experience 
Successful mode 
 Figure 1: the basic principle of the traditional approach to decision-making  
Source: Xie. (2001). Risk-based Approach to Maritime Safety. Unpublished master’s dissertation, 
Malmö, Sweden: World Maritime University. 
 
 
 
In the marine sector, people have identified considerable hazards and risks as well as 
developed relevant policies, decisions and regulations to safeguard the shipping 
industry by using this traditional approach. However, in the public mind the marine 
industry is still crowned with the title of high risk and is always associated with 
frequent tragic marine casualties and startling oil pollution etc. People cannot help 
asking: are there any more appropriate approaches?   
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1.3 Risk-based decision-making (RBDM) 
 
Risk-based decision-making has become a hot topic recently in industry and 
government, and the maritime community is no exception. The United States Coast 
Guard (USCG, 2005) defines it as “a process that organizes information about the 
possibility for one or more unwanted outcomes into a broad, orderly structure that 
helps decision makers make more informed management choices”.  
 
The adoption of different maritime policies will result in various outcomes. Some are 
what we want while others are unwanted outcomes which include the harmful effects 
on safety and health, environmental damage, property loss, or mission failure etc. An 
obvious feature of risk-based decision-making differing from the traditional approach 
to decision-making is that the information about the possibility for one or more 
unwanted outcomes is considered. RBDM adds to the decision-making process a 
systematic consideration of diverse risks that may be important to various 
stakeholders. A wide range of risk analysis tools (from very simple to very 
sophisticated) is available to help decision-makers develop the right information 
about risks to support their decision-making. Macesker & Myers (2005) say: “The 
question is not, ‘Should I use risk-based decision-making?’ The question is, ‘How 
should I use risk-based decision-making?’ The key is to focus on using the most 
suitable tool(s) for detailed situations.” 
    
The need for risk-based decision-making in maritime policy is obvious, as the 
resources that the public and private sectors can devote to navigational safety, traffic 
efficiency and environmental protection are finite. If these limited resources are 
spent dealing with low-risk problems at the expense of high-risk ones, then the 
industry will be exposed to higher risks that cannot be withstood due to an imbalance 
in resources distribution. The application of risk-based decision-making could 
remedy these situations. Risk-based decision-making provides a powerful tool that 
can help ensure that limited public and private resources are allocated more 
8 
effectively to reducing risks, maximizing the protection of maritime safety and 
environment as well as increasing traffic efficiency (AIChE, 1997).  
 
1.4 Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) 
 
Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) can be defined as a service implemented by a 
competent authority, designed to improve the safety and efficiency of vessel traffic 
and to protect the environment. The service should have the capability to interact 
with the traffic and to respond to traffic situations developing in the VTS area 
(International Maritime Organization, 1997). The first VTS was established in 
Douglas, Isle of Man, in 1948, in the form of a shore based radar station which could 
provide traffic images in order to keep maritime traffic flows moving in port areas 
and their approaches against the impact of poor visibility conditions, especially dense 
fog that had seriously delayed and shut down the port operations. The early VTSs 
were intended primarily to avoid traffic delays and to increase the efficiency of 
traffic flows in general. However, attention was also being given to the number of 
accidents and the way in which these might be reduced. The studies indicated that the 
number of traffic accidents decreased significantly due to the establishment of VTS 
(International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities, 
2002). In the nineteen seventies major oil tanker disasters (e.g. Torrey Canyon, 
Amoco Cadiz etc.) aroused public awareness of the importance of protecting marine 
environment and people began pondering how to develop the role of VTS in 
pollution prevention. In the meantime, IMO became concerned and discussed VTS 
issues with IALA. In 1997, IMO adopted a new Assembly Resolution on VTS 
(A.857(20)), “Guidelines For Vessel Traffic Services”, which superseded the old one 
adopted in 1985. This Guideline, associated with SOLAS regulation V/8-2, describes 
the principles and general operational provisions for the operation of a VTS and 
participating vessels.                
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Due to the development of larger and less manoeuvrable ships, the increasing traffic 
volume, dangerous cargoes and the potential for environment pollution, establishing 
a VTS to reduce these risks, as a valid measure, has been a practical solution in many 
ports and waterways around the world. The number of VTS systems worldwide has 
increased rapidly during the last two decades and there are now about 500 of these 
services available in total. In particular, with the recent booming seaborne trade, the 
implementation of new VTS and the re-assessment of an existing VTS worldwide are 
reaching a new high tide. However, constructing a VTS is a considerable investment 
and its subsequent operation is also very money-consuming; some VTSs do not play 
an important role as people anticipate; many seafarers regard VTS simply as a party 
they have to contact when passing through reporting lines while some VTS cannot 
provide sophisticated services for crew or cannot meet local waterborne traffic 
requirement; some VTSs have had to close down because of financial considerations, 
(for instance New York VTS stopped its services in 1988 and reopened in 1990 due 
to budget problems etc.). All these depressing news has prompted those persons, who 
were enthused to establish VTS once, to speculate calmly about what is wrong with 
it.    
 
The maritime industry operates in an increasingly complex world in which changes – 
technological, financial, organizational – take place more quickly, are more extensive 
and run deeper than ever before. Rapid changes lead to higher risk and a greater need 
to understand and analyse the risk. The final results will depend on how these factors 
are dealt with in practice in advance and how the important elements are analysed 
(Ullring, 1998). Consequently, how to plan a VTS perfectly, which will result in 
fulfilling its functions validly, contributing in reaching its purposes to the greatest 
extent as envisaged, and establishing whether the investment required is justified, 
becomes key considerations faced by each VTS stakeholder.  
 
The traditional approach to safety in the maritime sectors has been reactive - to react 
to problems as they occur. Instead of reacting in an ad hoc way to a problem, a 
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careful analysis of the risk situation should be carried out while keeping financial and 
resource constraints in mind, which is of special importance to the concerned 
stakeholders and decision-makers. So in order to lower risks rationally as much as 
possible, it is suggested that when planning a VTS, decision-makers should use 
proactive methods, which could be the application of the principle of risk-based 
decision-making on maritime fields. A practical framework recommended by IMO 
for RBDM on maritime fields is Formal Safety Assessment (FSA). 
 
1.5 Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
 
FSA was originally developed partly at least as a response to the Piper Alpha disaster 
of 1988, when an offshore platform exploded in the North Sea and 167 people lost 
their lives (IMO, 2005). As a result of the studies with respect to scientific decision-
making for years, two organs of IMO, MSC and MEPC, jointly developed and 
approved “the Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO 
rule-making process”. As the Guidelines (2002) mention, FSA is a structured and 
systematic methodology, aimed at enhancing maritime safety, including the 
protection of life, health, the marine environment and property, by using risk analysis 
and cost benefit assessment. It provides a framework for applying the principle of 
RBDM in the IMO rule-making process.  
 
Member Governments are also recommended to apply FSA when it is deemed 
necessary. IMO (2002) stresses that its application would be particularly relevant to 
proposals for regulatory measures which have far-reaching implications in terms of 
either cost (to society or the maritime industry), or the legislative and administrative 
burdens which may result. FSA may also be helpful when there is a need for risk 
reduction but the outcomes of the required decisions are unclear. This gives Member 
Governments a clearer insight into the policy and a trustworthy platform on which 
they form policies. Similarly, it can assist stakeholders or decision-makers to 
evaluate the rationality, necessity and cost-effectiveness of a marine project. So from 
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the author’s point of view, it is very useful and significant to do the research 
concerning the application of FSA, a framework of RBDM on the marine sector, 
when planning VTS.  
 
According to the IMO Guidelines (2002), FSA should comprise the following five 
steps:  
.1 identification of hazards; 
.2 risk analysis; 
.3 risk control options; 
.4 cost benefit assessment; and 
.5 recommendations for decision-making. 
 
Figure 2 depicts a flow chart of the FSA methodology. 
 
      FSA Methodology 
Step 5 
Decision-making 
Recommendation 
Step 4 
Cost Benefit Assessment 
Step 3 
Risk Control Options 
Step 2 
Risk 
Assessment 
Step 1 
Hazard         
Identification 
Decision-makers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Flow chart of the FSA methodology 
Source: International Maritime Organization. (2002). Guideline for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) 
for Use in the IMO Rule-making Process (MSC/Circ.1023, MEPC/Circ.392). London: Author 
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Many scientific disciplines deal with FSA in order to develop solutions for 
applications in their particular field of interest. As a result of the often- 
interdisciplinary nature, numerous approaches for a variety of safety and security 
problems have been developed over the years. Although there are many different 
methodologies available in order to evaluate different kinds of risks they all follow 
similar principles, which can be seen in the following Figure 3 (Schröder, 2005).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk analysis 
  Risk evaluation / 
management 
Yes
NO
Develop / introduce risk reduction 
measures 
• Hazard prevention 
• Mitigation 
No further action necessary but review  
hazards and risk evaluation regularly 
Are hazard control 
measures adequate?
Evaluate risks 
Compare risk levels with acceptance criteria 
Risk estimation 
• Estimate hazard frequency (likelihood) 
• Estimate risk 
Evaluate hazards 
• Establish underlying causes 
• Determine extent/nature of consequences
Identify risks 
 
 Figure 3: General risk assessment process 
 Source: Waring & Glendon (1998) 
 
In practice, the process of FSA begins with the decision-makers defining the problem 
to be assessed along with any relevant boundary conditions or constraints, then for 
any potential problem or operation to be safeguarded risks and hazards need to be 
identified first. Next, the identified risks need to be estimated and evaluated 
separately or integrated against the defined risk acceptance criteria. If the assessed 
risk is higher than the criteria, the corresponding risk control options need to be 
specified in order to limit the risk down to a level with which the stakeholders or 
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decision-makers would be satisfied or accept. In further steps, the specified options 
need to be determined whether or not they are worthwhile through conducting a cost-
benefit analysis. The option that is assessed as a cost-effective one will generally be 
adopted and presented in decision-making recommendations.      
 
Undoubtedly, the above concepts and framework similarly are applicable to the 
RBDM for planning VTS. However, VTS, as an option in implementing waterways 
management, is different from other options in terms of principles, scale, scope, costs 
and stakeholders. Consequently, detailed application of FSA on planning VTS would 
definitely have its own features and characteristics, which have some significant 
discrepancies from other options. In the following chapters, the author will introduce 
the detailed methods and models, some of which are demonstrated and interpreted 
through a concrete example of Wuhan Port, that in particular are suitable to the 
general application of FSA on planning VTS. A short introduction to Wuhan Port 
can be seen in Appendix A.      
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Identification of Risks and Hazards 
 
In the previous chapter, the concept and process of FSA was briefly introduced. FSA, 
as a practical framework for RBDM on maritime sectors, adds to the decision-
making process a systematic consideration of diverse risks and hazards that influence 
the various stakeholders. So identification of the risks and hazards is logically 
regarded as the first step of FSA, which comprises five steps in total as seen in 
Figure 2.  
 
At the inception of FSA, the first step is to answer the question of what categories of 
hazards exist in the defined system, which lead to the failure or unacceptance of the 
system. In its guideline for FSA, IMO (2002) points out that:  
The purpose of step 1 is to identify a list of hazards and associated scenarios 
prioritized by risk level specific to the problem under review. The purpose is 
achieved by the use of standard techniques to identify hazards which can 
contribute to accidents, and by screening these hazards using a combination 
of available data and judgement.   
As far as planning VTS is concerned, what categories of risks and hazards should be 
identified depends on the purpose of VTS. As mentioned above, VTS may play an 
important role, mainly in respect of improving maritime safety, the protection of the 
marine environment and the efficiency of navigation. Consequently, it is necessary to 
take into account those factors which directly determine the risk levels in these three 
aspects or the deeper layer of factors which indirectly, however more systematically 
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and essentially uncover the underlying causes behind the levels that can not be 
accepted by decision makers and need to be improved by the means of establishing a 
new VTS or upgrading an existing VTS. These two tiers of factors correspond to the 
two approaches used for hazard identification. The former is achieved by using an 
analytical technique whereas the latter is put into effect using creative methods. In 
the Guidelines on Risk Management, IALA (2000) recommends that the two 
approaches be combined in order to identify as many relevant hazards as possible.               
 
In hazard identification methodology, the analytical element ensures that previous 
experience is properly taken into account and typically makes use of background 
information as followed in terms of planning VTS:  
1. the existing navigational regulations;  
2. historical statistical data on maritime accidents; 
3. traffic volume per year within the planned VTS area; 
4. main mixture of traffic flows (main crossing traffic flows against main traffic 
flow); 
5. the category and amount of dangerous cargoes loaded and discharged within the 
defined port per year; 
6. the local conditions like geography, hydro/meteo, tides and weather; 
7. the local marine environment affected by shipping industry. 
 
The creative element is to ensure that the identification process is proactive through 
aiming at identifying the causes and effects of accidents and relevant hazards instead 
of confining it only to hazards that have materialized in the past. As is known to all, 
the human element is the most important contributory aspect to the causation and 
avoidance of incidents. So appropriate techniques for incorporating human factors 
should be used. In Resolution A.947 (23), IMO (2003) states that:  
The human element is a complex multi-dimensional issue that affects marine 
safety, security and marine environmental protection. It involves the entire 
spectrum of human activities performed by ships’ crews, shore-based 
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management, regulatory bodies, recognized organizations, shipyards, 
legislators, and other relevant parties, all of whom need to co-operate to 
address human element issues effectively. 
 
In applying FSA when planning for a VTS, the decision-makers shall focus on how 
errors in respect of ships’ crews, shore-based management and regulatory bodies lead 
to the failure of the system which can be defended to reach an acceptable standard by 
implementing waterways management, especially by establishing a VTS in a planned 
area. In the third step of FSA, risk control options (RCOs) will be elaborated and 
potential risk control measures (RCMs) could be identified through analysing these 
human errors, so the underlying causes may also be left to step 3 to be uncovered.        
 
2.1 Define problem 
 
As a structure and systematic methodology by using risk analysis and cost benefit 
assessment, FSA may be applied widely in fields from the IMO rule-making process 
to a maritime administration proposal for regulatory measures, and from the 
formulation of a new IMO instrument to planning a maritime project regardless of its 
scope. Although FSA has a similar principle, concept and steps in all kinds of 
research as long as it is applicable, decision-makers should take into account 
different factors determining the performance of a system and its corresponding 
range of study when aiming at a specific project or a category of projects so that the 
problem under analysis and its boundaries could be carefully defined stating the 
associated risk issues. This is the most important phase in FSA and it both guides the 
whole process, how to be within a proper boundary, and guarantees that the limited 
research resources are appropriately utilized and deployed. 
 
The problem boundaries of a formal safety assessment study can be developed in the 
following manner (Pillay and Wang, 2004):  
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• Range of the vessel 
• Geographical boundaries 
• Risks to be considered 
• Vessel systems 
• Relevant regulations 
• Measures of risks  
 
Based on the above proposal of the specialists, as well as the features and functions 
VTS has in doing waterways management, problem definition in terms of planning 
VTS may focus on the following six aspects: VTS vessels, types of VTS, traffic rules 
and regulations, risks to be considered, geographical boundaries and determination of 
risks.  
 
2.1.1 VTS vessels 
 
VTS vessels mean the participating vessels in VTS. The targets that ship traffic 
management aims at are the vessels in an assigned area, which generally do not cover 
all vessels. In IMO Resolution A.857(20), it is recommended that vessels navigating 
in an area where vessel traffic services are provided should make use of these 
services and vessels should be allowed to use a VTS where mandatory participation 
is not required. However, VTS vessels have to be equipped with the necessary 
navigational aids and radio communication apparatus in accordance with SOLAS 74 
while communication with the VTS and VTS vessels should be conducted on the 
assigned frequencies or channels according to established ITU and SOLAS chapter 
IV procedures. This is a mandatory requirement for VTS vessels in respect of 
equipment. It has been shown that IMO does not coerce all ships into participating 
VTS and it would be difficult to implement traffic management on those vessels 
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especially when they do not possess any capability of communication. Generally 
speaking, VTS services are rendered via VHF. Consequently, VTS vessels may be 
defined as the vessels carrying VHF in the VTS area.  
 
In the water area of Wuhan port, all ships must at least be equipped with VHF 
working on channels 8 and 16 in accordance with the norm of Chinese river ship 
construction and classification or SOLAS 74, except a very small number of wooden 
fishing boats and barges without power which are always towed or pushed by tugs. 
This provides a prerequisite for establishing VTS because communication, as one of 
the essential ingredients of the VTS system, makes sure the establishment of valid 
relations between VTS organization and VTS vessel.     
 
2.1.2 Types of VTS  
 
A VTS can improve the safety of traffic through the foresighted prevention of 
situations of unacceptable risk, by contributing to safe encounters from the above 
foresighted measures and by assisting ships to keep within navigable waters (IALA, 
2002). In the process of FSA, the application of which would be particularly relevant 
to proposals which may have far-reaching implications in terms of either cost or the 
legislative and administrative burdens that may result, cost/benefit analysis plays a 
vital role in justifying the discussed projects or measures. The benefits achievable by 
a VTS depend on its types which may be divided by the services provided and the 
functions performed, as follows: 
 
The Information Service ensures that essential information is available in a timely 
manner to the shipboard decision process, either by broadcasting at fixed times or if 
deemed necessary by the VTS. This is normally provided to general traffic. 
 
The Traffic Organisation Service is concerned with the forward planning of 
movements to prevent the development of dangerous situations. 
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 The Navigational Assistance Service assists the navigational decision-making 
process on board, participating by giving information and services.  
 
The Co-operation with allied services and other interested parties is a supporting 
service for exchanging information, using common data bases and action agreement.        
                                                                                                                (IALA, 2002)  
 
When planning VTS, decision-makers should determine the type of planned VTS 
and associated level of the above mentioned services on the basis of the outcomes of 
hazard identification (step 1) and risk analysis (step 2). 
 
2.1.3 Traffic rules and regulations 
 
Although COLREG 1972 has a predominant status in worldwide seaborne traffic, as 
far as port areas, coastal areas and other sensitive waters are concerned, navigation 
safety and efficiency generally need to be reinforced through adopting and 
implementing the relevant traffic rules and regulations which may include not only 
those defining the navigational requirements such as traffic routes, speed limits, 
anchorage areas etc, but also any special requirements such as compulsory pilotage 
and pilot boarding areas, traffic separation schemes, ship reporting systems and  
prohibited or precaution zones etc. In other words, the risk level of an area depends 
on its traffic patterns to some extent.  
 
The Port of Wuhan is a typical river port within which the Chinese River Code for 
Preventing Collisions is the principal traffic rules. Meanwhile, the Code is 
complemented by some local traffic rules and regulations promulgated by the 
Yangtze MSA and Wuhan MSA in order to implement more effective waterways 
management in the waters of Wuhan port. Compared to COLREG 72, the provisions 
of the Code are much more complicated due to the features of the river and its traffic. 
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However, as shown in Figure 4, the principle of the Code could be summarized in 
one sentence: ships sailing down go by swift flow whereas ships going upstream 
navigate by slow flow.         
 
   
                                  
Traffic flow: 
Area of slow flow 
Area of slow flow
Area of swift flow 
Area of swift flow
Main flow direction of the Yangtze River 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4: an illustration of the principle of the Chinese River Code for Preventing Collisions 
 
Another important traffic pattern is called the sailing cross area, as shown in Figure 
5, where ships going upstream have to cross the traffic flow sailing down due to the 
existence of a concave area shown as the shaded area in Figure 2, which can 
influenced negatively the manoeuvrability of ships going upstream. Nevertheless, the 
establishment of this area increases the probability of ship cross encounters and 
collisions.            
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 Sailing cross area 
Main flow direction of the Yangtze River: 
 
 
Dangerous concave area: Traffic flow of going upstream:  
 Figure 5: an illustration of the sailing cross area 
 
2.1.4 Risks to be considered 
 
What is risk? Is it synonymous to hazard? The report of a Royal Society Study Group 
(1992) defines risk as “the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a 
stated period of time, or results from a particular challenge where an adverse event is 
an occurrence that produces harm”. As to hazard and harm, the report (1992) states 
that “hazard is seen as the situation that in particular circumstances could lead to 
harm, where harm is the loss to a human being (or to the human population) 
consequent on damage and damage is the loss of inherent quality suffered by an 
entity (physical and biological)”. 
 
The risk management of waterways involves the systematic identification, evaluation 
and control of potential losses, which may arise from future events which have an 
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impact on the safety of the ship, marine environment and traffic efficiency. Examples 
of these events are fires, explosions, environmental damage, release of toxic gases, 
collisions, groundings, extreme weather, structural failure and loss of stability etc. 
(Monioudis, 1997). So from the angle of the marine industry, risk can be explained 
as the probability that a maritime incident occurs during a stated period of time.  
 
Different agencies define marine incidents in different ways. In the Code for the 
Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents (IMO, 1997), it is stated that:    
Marine incident means an occurrence or event being caused by, or in 
connection with, the operations of a ship by which the ship or any person is 
imperilled, or as a result of which serious damage to the ship or structure or 
the environment might be caused. 
 
The Regulations of China on the Investigation and Handling of Maritime Traffic 
Accidents (1990) is applicable to the following accidents occurring to vessels and 
installations:    
(1) Collision, strike or damage by waves;  
(2) Hitting hidden rocks or running aground;  
(3) Fire or explosion;  
(4) Sinking;  
(5) Damage or loss of machinery parts or important tools during a voyage 
which affects the vessel's seaworthiness;  
(6) Other maritime traffic accidents which cause losses in property and 
human lives. 
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However, in planning VTS, risks to be considered only comprise those accidents 
related to movements and the dynamics of vessels that could be prevented or 
decreased by VTS, including collision, grounding, hitting hidden rocks, contact, 
wave damage etc, plus damage to the environment or fire and explosion if caused by 
the above incidents. On the other hand, when making a cost/benefit analysis in the 
fourth step of FSA, the decision-makers should take into consideration of other 
accidents in estimating the benefit that the establishment of VTS can contribute to, 
because VTS could participate in SAR activities and mitigate the consequence of 
those accidents. For instance, an explosion caused by crew smoking on board the 
ship should be excluded in identifying the risks and hazards of FSA step1, whereas it 
should be considered in doing cost/benefit analysis if VTS is involved in the rescue 
of this ship.  
 
2.1.5 Geographical boundaries 
 
There are three categories of VTS: Port or Harbour VTS, Coastal VTS and River 
VTS. A Port VTS is mainly concerned with vessel traffic to and from a port or 
harbour or harbours, while a Coastal VTS is mainly concerned with vessel traffic 
passing through the area (IMO, VTS Guidelines, 1997). A River VTS which usually 
renders information services as well as navigational assistance and traffic 
organization services, could be regarded as a combination of these two types. In its 
Guidelines, IMO sets out eleven criteria for an area in which VTS is particularly 
appropriate if the area meets any of them. In fact, these criteria also theoretically 
determine the geographical boundaries of a planned VTS. In FSA, the decision- 
makers may refer to these criteria to define what areas need to be studied. 
 
Wuhan port, as one of the busiest river ports in China, has a high traffic density, 
complex navigation patterns and difficult hydrographical and hydrological elements. 
Consequently, the whole water area of Wuhan port should be considered in applying 
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FSA when planning Wuhan VTS. The Geographical boundaries of this study are the 
same as those described in a brief view of Wuhan port in Appendix A. 
 
2.1.6 Determination of risk 
 
Mathematically, risk is defined as the probability of an adverse event times its 
impact. The probability can be simply expressed as the mean number of marine 
accidents per year or be more complicatedly estimated by establishing mathematical 
models, while the impact, provided that it occurs, can be calculated in different ways. 
There are monetary methods, count methods and index methods. 
 
Monetary methods are particularly appropriate to evaluate the loss in the form of 
damage to property or economy. They also facilitate the analysts to categorize the 
accidents in terms of loss as well as make acceptability and cost/benefit analyses in 
the process of FSA due to its obvious comparability. However, in some 
circumstances, it is not always easy to calculate the loss in monetary terms, 
especially when life loss, damage to the environment and impact on mentality and 
psychology are involved. Instead, it is sometimes easier to simply count the amount 
of loss that happened in the stated years. Index methods, which determine the level 
of risk by giving weight value to individual accidents, are a variety or a combination 
of the former two kinds of methods. All these three types of methods can be used by 
decision makers at their discretion in FSA according to the data and information they 
can collect.   
 
2.2 Identification of risks and hazards 
 
It is recommended that the output from this step comprises a list of risks / hazards / 
unwanted events and their preliminary description. The prioritisation of risk is 
fundamental to the following analysis of risks. There are a number of ways in which 
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this can be done and these will vary depending upon the risks under consideration 
and the particular methodology being employed (Dickson, 2003).  
 
The Chinese VTS project group (1989) thought that there are a lot of factors 
contributing to marine accidents in harbours and affecting the level of port traffic 
environment, which could be generally categorized into three main groups as shown 
in Figure 6: hydro/meteo factors, fairway factors and vessel traffic factors. These 
factors can be regarded as risks and hazards that need to be identified in planning 
VTS. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Factors contributing to marine accidents and affecting the level of port traffic 
environment   
Source: Chinese VTS project group. (1989). Research Reports on Class Division of Vessel Traffic 
Management In Coastal Harbour of China. Dalian: Author.    
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However, with globally seaborne transport for crude oil and dangerous cargoes on 
the sharp increase, as well as reinforcement of public awareness on aspects of a 
friendly environment, marine pollution has come more and more under the spotlight, 
especially after the disastrous oil spill incidents such as the Exxon Valdez, Erika, 
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Prestige etc. Consequently, it is necessary to add the factors covering dangerous 
cargoes and marine pollution into the above lists for more comprehensive 
identification of the local traffic hazards.  
 
Then according to a preliminary description of these hazards, as well as qualitative 
and quantitative analysis, the whole water area being studied in planning VTS can be 
divided into several sub-areas which are ranked in view of the sensitivity of 
navigation safety and the marine environment. Moreover, through collecting and 
analysing the historical maritime accident data in the evaluated area, local accidents 
or risks can also be ranked by considering types of accidents, types of loss and their 
geographical distribution. Next, the comparison and combination between rank of 
areas and rank of risks could result in a prioritized list of areas and a prioritized list 
of risks. The model for Step1, identification of navigational and environmental risks, 
is indicated in Figure 7: 
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Figure 7: Step1 Identification of navigational and environmental risks 
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2.2.1 Local traffic hazards 
 
• Traffic volume 
 
Traffic volume means the sum of amount of vessels in a specific area during a stated 
time, including transit traffic, entry/leave port traffic and internal traffic, which 
reflects to what extent the area is busy or congested. Generally speaking, more traffic 
volume could result in higher maritime risks. Fujii & Matui (1984) give two 
mathematic formulas as followed when estimating frequency of collisions with 
objects and groundings as well as frequency of ships collision:  
 
                                                 (1) dLdVdtVDNau ∫∫∫= φρ1
 
                                  (2) dSdtdVdVdLdLVNau r 212121)2/(2 φφρ∫∫∫ ∫∫∫ ∫∫∫ 2=
Nau1 --- the number of ships in collisions with objects and groundings; 
ρ --- the density of traffic; 
V --- traffic flow speed;  
D --- the cross section;  
Φ --- the normalized distribution function of the ship length and the velocity; 
L --- length of traffic flow; 
t --- time;  
Nau2 --- the number of collision of ships;   
Φ1, Φ2 --- normalized distribution function of the ship size and velocity; 
Vr --- the relative speed 
S --- area.  
 
The above formulas not only indicate the relation between density of traffic and 
number of accidents but also illustrate that traffic volume is a considerable factor that 
influences the local traffic risk. 
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The calculation of traffic volume in a defined area can be done through a visual 
survey and looking up vessel arrival/departure/in-port traffic records. Due to the 
limitation of human power and resources, it is impossible for researchers to carry out 
a visual survey 365 days a year. Generally visual survey, which particularly is 
appropriate to estimate the transit and entry/leave port traffic volume, is implemented 
by recording the number, types and sizes of vessels passing through the observation 
lines in three or four continuous days per three months or half a year. The result, as a 
sample, can be used to estimate approximately the whole year traffic volume passing 
those lines. Yang & Wu (1992) gave the formula as follows for calculating traffic 
volume per year. The traffic volume per year (1999-2003) in Wuhan port and its 
distribution can be seen in Appendix B. 
                           ∑∑
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1 )(                                                  (3) 
K: the mean traffic volume per year; 
m: the number of years carrying out  visual survey; 
Kj: internal traffic volume in No.j year; 
n:  the number of days carrying out visual survey per year; 
Kji: visual survey traffic volume in No.i day in No.j year. 
 
 
• Main mix of traffic 
 
It is easily understood that most collisions between ships happen in crossing 
situations rather than in the case of overtaking and head-on. The mix of traffic is a 
very important factor determining the complexity of local traffic. Baldauf (2003) 
gave statistics concerning the comparison of accident numbers in the previous traffic 
mode and the new one adopting the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) in the UK 
coastal area from 1957 to 1981, as follows.    
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Table 1: Accident number in UK coastal area from 1957 to 1981 
 
Sea area 1957-1961 1962-1966 1967-1971 1972-1976 1977-1981 
Strait of Dover 52 56 36 14 12 
Southern North Sea 79 81 66 29 19 
English Channel  23 30 22 21 14 
Total  154 167 124 64 45 
Close to/in TSS 128 140 89 34 24 
Outside TSS 28 36 29 30 21 
Source: Baldauf, Michael (2003). Statistics about the Comparison of Accidents Number in Previous 
Traffic Mode and New One Adopting TSS in UK Coastal Area From 1957 to 1981. The Personal 
Communication. Wismar University: Author. 
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Figure 8: Accident number in UK coastal area from 1957 to 1981 
Source: Baldauf, Michael (2003). Statistics about the Comparison of Accidents Number in Previous 
Traffic Mode and New One Adopting TSS in UK Coastal Area From 1957 to 1981. The Personal 
Communication. Wismar University: Author. 
 
TSS is one kind of ships’ routing, which provides for the separation of opposing 
streams of traffic by appropriate means and by the establishment of traffic lanes, 
reduces dangers of collision between crossing traffic and ships in established traffic 
lanes as well as simplifies the patterns of traffic flow in converging areas (Transport 
Canada, 1991). For the above statistics indicated in Table 1 and Figure 8, it can be 
concluded that where close to / in TSS, the number of marine accidents dramatically 
decreased while outside TSS the level of traffic risk was still kept relatively 
invariable. So the more line intersects created by the max of traffic in the defined 
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area, the more complicated the traffic mode is and the more probabilities of marine 
incidents there will be. The quantity of encountering points can be regarded as one of 
the parameters for evaluating and prioritizing the areas in terms of risks. The main 
mix of traffic in Wuhan Port is briefly introduced in Appendix B. 
 
• Hydrology / meteo     
 
In respect of hydrology / meteo, the factors giving influence to accident probability 
mainly include visibility, current and wind. 
 
Poor visibility is caused by fog in most circumstances. It tremendously reduces the 
amount of information that seafarers on board vessels can obtain from outside due to 
the limitation of their visual sense so that officers manoeuvring vessels have great 
difficulty in making appropriate decisions. In harbour and river areas, the local 
Maritime Authority generally promulgates strict navigation rules upon a vessel’s 
behaviour in poor visual range while COLREG states in Rule 19 (conduct of vessels 
in restricted visibility) that every vessel should proceed at a safe speed adapted to the 
prevailing circumstances and restricted visibility. Fujii and Yamanouchi (1974) 
divided 562 collisions and 354 groundings in six Japanese straits from 1966 to 1971 
into groups with respect to the visual range and the analysis with these data and the 
frequency of visual ranges indicates that the ratio of the number of accidents is 
inversely proportional to the visual range for both collision and grounding. 
Furthermore, when visibility is below a certain extent, vessel traffic in harbour could 
have to stop totally. So poor visibility has a considerable impact upon traffic 
efficiency and traffic safety. 
 
Wind and current also influence the traffic volume and frequency of accidents. 
Strong winds can lead to a ship’s deviation from planned lines and restriction in its 
ability to manoeuvre, which may possibly result in a grounding or collision 
especially in narrow channels and fairways. After studying the relationship between 
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the number of relative accidents and wind speed, Qi (1991) gave the following 
formula: 
                  kw = 7.9vw – 11.6 ,   kw 0                 ≥
                 kw --- number of relative accidents; 
                 vw--- wind force on the Beaufort scale.  
This formula indicates that there is a linear feature between kw and vw and different 
wind forces have different impacts on vessel traffic safety.  
 
The effects of current on vessel traffic mainly focus on two aspects: one is the 
influence on movement and manoeuvre functions of a vessel while another is on 
traffic volume. When a vessel goes upstream within the current, its rudder effect will 
generally improve. Conversely when it sails down, it is more difficult for the crew to 
manipulate the ship due to the poorer rudder effect. In addition, cross currents may 
give rise to a ship’s deviation from correct lines and lead to traffic accidents. In some 
harbours affected by tide, small boats often catch tides for easily entering into or 
departing from the harbours so that traffic volume sharply increases at that time. 
Kandori (1972) analyzed the influence of current and wind and indicated that 
collision risk increases three times for tidal current over six knots in Hayatomoseto 
but a survey in Oseto did not underwrite this tendency. His study showed a 
considerable increase in the risks of both collision and grounding in the Kanmon 
Strait for winds over 20 knots. From these studies, we can also draw a conclusion 
that visibility, current and wind are the hazards that need to be identified in planning 
VTS. A short introduction of visibility, current and wind in Wuhan Port can be seen 
in Appendix B.    
 
• Dangerous cargoes and marine pollution 
 
The harmfulness of dangerous cargoes mainly consists of their operational, 
intentional and accidental discharge into oceans, seas and rivers as well as the 
second-effect on seafarers, ships and environment such as fire, explosion and spills 
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etc., when vessels carrying them are involved in marine accidents. The briefing of 
dangerous cargoes in Wuhan Port is illustrated in Appendix B. 
 
Seas, rivers and marine shoreline areas are important public and ecological resources. 
Water environments affect human health as they are often used for drinking water. 
The water and shoreline also provide public recreation area throughout the world and 
serve as homes to a variety of wildlife species including mammals, aquatic birds, 
fish, microorganisms, and vegetation. However, their cleanliness and beauty, and the 
survival of the species that inhabit them, can be threatened by accidents that occur 
when oil and dangerous products are produced, stored and transported (EPA, 1999). 
In addition, once pollution happens, the associated costs for clean-up operations 
including shoreline clean-up and recovery of sunken oil may be significant even 
when only small quantities of spilled oil are involved.    
 
Figure 9 illustrates that there is no linear relationship between spill cost and size of 
tanker (which might in turn be considered indicative of spill volume). Indeed, some 
of the most expensive spills have been caused by relatively small tankers. In these 
cases the most important factor has been the type and place of oil spilled. For 
example, both the NAKHODKA and ERIKA spilled heavy fuel oil, which is highly 
persistent and came ashore along long lengths of coastline (ITOPF, 2004). So 
maritime pollution also ought to be identified as a kind of hazard in applying FSA on 
planning VTS.   
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Figure 9:  The costs of oil spills  
 Source: International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited. (2004). The Costs of Oil Spills.  From the World Wide Web:  http://www.itopf.com/costs.html 
 
 
• Local geographical conditions 
 
To the impact of geographical conditions, IALA (2002) states: “The local geography 
will be the determining influence on the size of the area to be covered by a VTS. In 
the case of ports these vary enormously in their geography. Some ports, are 
extremely simple and are little more than an indentation in the coast protected by 
breakwaters. Entry/exit is through a passage between the breakwater heads, which 
give direct access to the open sea. Vessels are only restricted in their freedom to 
manoeuvre as they pass through the breakwater and into the port itself. At the other 
extreme are estuarial ports, often far from the open sea with long approaches 
encumbered by shallow, shifting sandbanks. Vessels using these ports will be 
restricted navigationally and possibly be unable to anchor or reveres course over long 
stretches of their passage. The prevailing weather, in particular visibility and wind 
together with the tidal range and stream, may impose difficulties on the ability to 
navigate safely. Together with the local geography they determine the degree of 
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navigational difficulty likely to be encountered by a vessel.” The geographical 
conditions in Wuhan Port are briefly introduced in Appendix B.  
 
2.2.2 Geographical Division 
 
The whole water area studied can be geographically divided into several sub-areas 
and ranked if necessary, especially when the size of the area is immense, according 
to the scenario of those factors determining the level of risks in the studied area in 
the process of planning VTS.    
 
Wuhan Port is spanned about 150 km along its main channel and 55 km along its 
branch channel. By considering the above principle, the Port can be delimited into 
four sub-areas. Their geographical descriptions are shown as follows:  
 
Sub-area1: from the downriver boundary of Wuhan Port to Qingshanxia anchorage;  
Sub-area2: from Qingshanxia anchorage to Wuhan third bridge of Yangtze River;   
Sub-area3: from Wuhan third bridge of Yangtze River to upriver boundary of Port; 
Sub-area4: the Hanjiang section of the Port. 
 
2.2.3 Preliminary rank of sub-areas 
 
As mentioned above, local traffic hazards comprise six factors: traffic volume, main 
mix of traffic, hydro/meteo, dangerous cargoes, marine pollution and local 
geographical conditions. The ranking of sub-areas can be identified through a 
comparison of their respective rank in six factors. For instance, a certain factor has 
different levels of risks in different sub-areas. As far as this factor is concerned, one 
sub-area will be given a higher value if this factor in this sub-area is more severe to 
navigation safety, environmental protection and traffic efficiency than that in another 
sub-area. Then all the values to different factors in each sub-area are 
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comprehensively evaluated and weighed in order to appropriately rank the different 
sub-areas. 
 
Wuhan Port is divided into four sub-areas. One sub-area is characterized as 4 with 
regard to a factor if this sub-area has the highest risk in respect of this factor among 
all the sub-areas. However, it will be valued as 1 if it has the lowest risk. According 
to the scenario of these factors, four sub-areas in Wuhan Port are assessed as shown 
in Table 2 and Figure 10. 
 
Table 2: Rank of sub-areas in Wuhan Port 
factors to be considered sub-area1 sub-area2 sub-area3 sub-area4 
traffic volume 3 4 2 1 
main mix of traffic  2 4 3 1 
hydro/meteo 4 4 4 1 
dangerous cargoes 4 3 2 1 
marine pollution 3 4 3 4 
local geographical conditions 3 4 2 1 
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Figure 10: Rank of sub-areas in Wuhan Port 
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Table 2 and Figure 10 indicate that sub-area2 has the highest risk in all factors except 
dangerous cargoes while sub-area4 has the lowest risk in each factor except marine 
pollution. Consequently, the preliminary ranking of sub-areas in terms of risk can be 
approximately identified from high to low as follows: 
                               { sub-area2; sub-area1; sub-area3; sub-area4 } 
 
2.2.4 Preliminary evaluation of local accidents 
 
The evaluation of risks depends on the accuracy and volume of collected data on 
casualties. Therefore, the collection of data would be a vital element in the successful 
objective application of the FSA, although it is possible to use subjective evaluation 
as an interim means with a reasonable degree of accuracy (Sekimizu, 1997). In the 
preliminary evaluation of local accidents, historical maritime accidents data can be 
collected from the Maritime Administration and analysed through identifying types 
of accidents, types of loss and the geographical distribution of accidents so that a 
justified rank of risks can be formed. 
 
Figure 11 illustrates the distribution of incident types in Wuhan Port. It can be noted 
that almost 70% of all accidents recorded by the Maritime Safety Administration 
were collisions, groundings, contact, contact bridge, hitting rock or wave damage 
that is related to the movements and dynamics of vessels and can be called traffic 
accidents. 
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Figure 11: Average Distribution of Incident Types in Wuhan Port (2000-2004) 
Source: Wuhan MSA. (2000-2004). 
 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the distribution of loss types in Wuhan Port from 2000 to 2004. 
It can be concluded that loss was severest in 2002 and 2003 whereas it was relatively 
minor in 2001.  
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Figure 12: Distribution of Loss Types in Wuhan Port (2000-2004) 
Source: Wuhan MSA. (2000-2004). 
 
The geographical distribution of all reported marine traffic incidents in Wuhan Port, 
developed from data for 2000 to 2004, is shown in Figure 13. the majority of 
incidents were concentrated in sub-area2 and sub-area3.    
 
From the above analysis of historical data, the outcome for ranking of risks can be 
roughly expressed from high to low as follows: 
{ collisions, grounding, contact, contact bridge, hitting rock, wave damage } 
{ sub-area2, sub-area3, sub-area1, sub-area4 } 
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Figure 13: Geographical Distribution of Traffic Incidents in Wuhan Port (2000-2004)   
Source: Wuhan MSA. (2000-2004). 
 
2.2.5 Comparison and combination  
 
The output from Step 1 of FSA comprises a prioritized list of risks/hazards/unwanted 
events by risk level and a preliminary description of the risks/hazards/unwanted 
events, which can be generated by comparison and combination of the identified 
scenarios of local traffic hazards, geographical subdivision, rank of sub-areas and 
rank of risks that all have been completed in previous phases. In order to reach the 
goal, methods of qualitative or quantitative analysis can be available, mainly 
depending on the scope of the collected data and the perspective of analysing the 
problems.     
 
Wuahan Port suffered from the fewest marine casualties in 2001, when its traffic 
volume was also the lowest, among the recent five years. It can partially underline 
the hypothesis that traffic volume is an important factor determining the risk level in 
Wuhan Port because other factors influencing risk level remained relatively 
unchanged in these five years. Meanwhile, a statistical analysis of environmental 
factors has been conducted to identify if there is any close correlation between 
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collisions / grounding / contact / contact bridge incidents and poor visibility, high 
wind, adverse weather and strong currents; however, none has been identified as 
having high enough significance. So, it can be said that these incidents making up the 
majority of all incidents, were mainly caused by the factors of traffic volume, local 
geographical conditions and traffic mix instead of hydro/meteo factors. 
 
2.2.6 Conclusion 
 
The outcome of the above analysis can promote the formation of prioritized lists with 
respect to risks, hazards and sub-areas. The lists for Wuhan Port are displayed by risk 
levels from high to low, as follows:     
Sub-areas:  { sub-area2, sub-area3, sub-area1, sub-area4 }; 
Risks:  { collisions, grounding, contact, contact bridge, hitting rock, wave damage }; 
Hazards: { traffic volume, local geographical conditions, main mix of traffic, 
dangerous cargoes, hydro/meteo, marine pollution }. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Risk analysis 
 
In the previous chapter it has been shown how a framework addresses the 
identification of risks and hazards in a planned VTS area in the context of planning 
VTS. When those identified risks occur there will always be an effect upon the risk 
level of the planned area. Therefore, their frequency and consequence have to be not 
only measured in some way but also assessed in a combined way by the stakeholders 
in order to determine whether or not they will be accepted.  
 
The preceding step in FSA is to answer the question of what categories of hazards 
exist in the defined system while the second step is to reveal how and to what extent 
they lead to the failure or unacceptance of the system. In its guideline for FSA, IMO 
(2002) points out that: 
The purpose of the risk analysis in step 2 is a detailed investigation of the 
causes and consequences of the more important scenarios identified in step 1. 
This can be achieved by the use of suitable techniques that model the risk. 
This allows attention to be focused upon high risk areas and to identify and 
evaluate the factors which influence the level of risk.  
 
As far as planning VTS is concerned, the choice of risk analysis model depends on 
the features of system that decision makers are studying or concentrating on. VTS is 
a complicated and large marine project, the establishment of which does not focus on 
the safety of a certain ship or a certain kind of marine incident but concerns the 
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navigation safety of all VTS vessels and their traffic efficiency as a whole as well as 
all marine traffic accidents in a vast VTS area. It determines that the applicable risk 
analysis model for planning VTS is macroscopic rather than microcosmic although 
macroscopic may be made up of several microcosmic units. 
 
Ayyub (2005) states: “When assessing and evaluating the uncertainties associated 
with an event, risk is defined as the potential for loss as a result of a system failure, 
and can be influenced by a pair of factors, one being the probability of occurrence of 
an event, also called a failure scenario, and the other being the potential outcome or 
consequence associated with the event’s occurrence”. This pairing can be represented 
by the equation:  
 

×

=


Event
eConsequencimpact
Time
EventLikelihood
Time
eConsequencRisk       (Ayyub, 2005) 
So risk analysis is assumed to include two major sub-activities, risk estimation and 
risk evaluation, where risk estimation comprises event-probability assessment and 
consequence assessment, and risk evaluation requires the definition of acceptable 
risk and a comparative evaluation of options.  
 
3.1 Risk estimation 
 
Information produced from the hazard identification phase will be processed to 
estimate risk. In the risk estimation phase, the likelihood and possible consequences 
of each System Failure Event (SFE) will be estimated, either on a qualitative basis or 
a quantitative basis (if the events are readily quantified) (Pillay & Wang, 2004).  
 
The purpose of frequency analysis is to determine how often a particular scenario 
might be expected to occur over a specified period of time. These estimates are often 
based on historical data, where judgements about the future are based on what has 
occurred in the past. If there are no relevant historical data available, or if these data 
are sparse, other methods such as fault-tree, or event-tree analysis, or other 
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mathematical or econometric models may be used. Estimates may also be based on 
expert experience and judgement. Most often, frequency estimates are based on a 
combination of these methods (IALA, 2000). 
 
In planning VTS, consequence analysis mainly involves estimating the impact in 
respect of navigation safety, traffic efficiency and the marine environment, which is 
determined by the purpose of establishing a VTS. The impact on navigation safety 
can be measured by three factors: numbers of injuries or deaths, property loss and 
other direct economic loss caused by traffic accidents while the impact on traffic 
efficiency can be estimated in two different ways: the annual day numbers of bad 
visibility which could stop local waterborne transport and the traffic density which 
could lead to traffic congestion in a certain area once it is too high. Impact on the 
marine environment has to some extent to do with the type and place of oil spilled as 
well as the local ecological environment and its sensitivity, which can be measured 
by numbers of wildlife affected, how heavy the influence on the quality of human 
life is and the associated costs for clean-up operations.      
 
3.1.1 Recommended models for risk estimation 
 
In IMO’s guidelines for FAS, several techniques are recommended for use in the 
process of risk analysis, which include fault tree analysis (FTA), event tree analysis 
(ETA), failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), hazard and operability studies 
(HAZOP), the what-if analysis technique, risk contribution tree (RCT) and influence 
diagrams. However, each method has its own appropriately applied fields and 
limitations, especially when they are intended to be used in a large marine project 
such as planning for VTS. 
 
• Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
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Fault tree analysis is a technique that, by means of tree structures, visually models 
the logical causal relationship between events that singly or in combination cause 
accidents, and determines the probability of a top event, which may be a type of 
accident or unintended hazardous outcome (IMO, 2002). One of applications of FTA 
on planning VTS for Wuhan Port can be exemplified as shown in Figure 14: 
 
Contact bridge probability in Wuhan Port ( Pc ) = 0.9x (9.1 E –4) + 0.1x (1.87 E –3) ≈ 1.01 E -3 
  
 
  
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
Lack of valid watchkeeping  
1.0 E- 4 
A4 
Human error  
2.6 E -4
or 
A1 A2 A3 
stress asleep 
1.2 E- 4 2.0 E -5 
6.5 E -4 2.6 E -4 
9.1 E -4 
1.87 E- 3 
2.6 E -4 6.5 E -4 9.6 E -4 
 
rudder failureHuman error  Human error  
 
 rudder failure 
R D A D A 
or or 
0.1 
Bad visibility 
B2 Human error or rudder  
or radar failure 
Human error or 
 rudder failure 
0.9 
Good visibility 
B1 
and and 
In bad visibility In good visibility 
or 
Contact bridge 
Probability: Pc=  
fatigue 
2.0 E -5 
 radar failure  
  Figure 14: Contact bridge FTA in Wuhan Port 
 
Source: Based on Friis-Hansen’ model (2005) 
 
FTA can be conducted qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitatively the relationship 
among events is illustrated; quantitatively the risk level and the relative importance 
of various events can be calculated. FTA is able to analyse common cause failures 
and failures caused by events in combination. It is effective when used to analyse the 
root causes of specific accidents with relatively complex combinations of events 
(Xie, 2001). However, FTA is a technique with a narrow focus; it only examines one 
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specific accident of interest. More fault trees should be developed in order to analyse 
other types of accidents. The quantification of analysis requires significant expertise 
and reliable statistical data (USCG, 2005).  
 
• Event tree analysis (ETA) 
 
Event tree analysis is a technique, which by means of a tree structure, visually 
models the possible outcomes of an initiating event. The model illustrates how 
safeguards and external influences, called lines of assurance, affect the path of 
accident chains (USCG, 2005). One example of ETA, which may be used in the 
process of risk analysis for planning VTS, is indicated in Figure 15 and Table 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
G2│ABCDEf 
g2│ABCDEf
S 
F2 
≈ 0 
G2│ABCDe
g2│ABCDe
S 
F3 
≈ 0 
G2│ABCd
g2│ABCd
S 
F4 
≈ 0 
G2│ABc
g2│ABc 
G2│Ab
g2│Ab 
G2│a 
g2│a 
F7 
1x10
-7 S S 
F6 
9x10
-11 S 
F5 
≈ 0 
g1│ABCDEF 
f│ABCDE
e│ABCD
d│ABC 
G1│ABCDEF 
F│ABCDE 
E│ABCD 
D│ABC 
c│AB 
C│AB 
b│A 
B│A 
a A
F1 
5x10
-10 
S 
 
Collision with an inspected vessel = µ x (PF1+PF2+PF3+PF4+PF5+PF6+PF7)  
                                                       ≈ (3650/yr) x (1.006x10-7) ≈ 3.67x10-4/yr 
Where: µ is the number of times per year that a passenger ferry is on a collision course with an 
inspected vessel (assuming that it is 0.5 time when it passes through the Yangtze River and it passes 
20 times a day, so µ = 0.5 x 20 x 365 = 3650/yr); s is safety while F is failure.   
 
 
Figure 15: ETA for passenger ferry on collision course with inspected vessel in Wuhan Port    
Source: Based on Guthrie’ model. (2000). 
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Table 3: Failure Description in ETA 
Safety 
symbol  
Failure  
symbol Failure Description 
Estimated 
Conditional 
Probability
a A passenger ferry officer fails to observe inspected vessel on radar 0.001 
b B passenger ferry co-officer fails to observe inspected vessel on radar 0.1 
c C passenger ferry officer fails to observe (see or hear) inspected vessel  0.01 
d D passenger ferry co-officer fails to observe (see or hear) inspected vessel  0.1 
e E passenger ferry wheelman fails to observe (see or hear) inspected vessel 0.5 
f F no communication to passenger ferry from other vessel 0.01 
g1 G1 
passenger ferry fails to adequately maneuver in time to avoid collision 
with inspected vessel given inspected vessel is not observed 1.0 
g2 G2 
passenger ferry fails to adequately maneuver in time to avoid collision 
with inspected vessel given inspected vessel is observed 0.0000007
Source: Based on Guthrie’ model. (2000). 
 
Qualitatively ETA shows the development path of accidents from the initiating 
events while it quantitatively presents the frequency, consequence of various 
sequence, and the relative importance of various sequence and contributing events. It 
is applicable for almost any kind of system while its scope is limited to only one 
initiating event; it is very effective to model accidents for the system with multiple 
safeguards and to determine the consequence brought about by various initiating 
events while it is not effective to be used to identify all causes that can result in 
accidents. The subtle dependency among various lines of assurance could be easily 
overlooked, which may lead to a certain uncertainty and incompleteness in the 
analysis (USCG, 2005). 
 
• Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) 
 
FMEA is an analysis tool assuming that a failure mode occurs in a system / 
component through some failure mechanism and the effects of this failure at this 
level and at high levels are then analysed and evaluated to determine their severity on 
the system as a whole while relevant actions are identified in order to eliminate or 
mitigate these effects. The application of this technique has been introduced in IMO 
High Speed Craft Code.   
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Being a systematic and highly structured technique, FMEA is primarily used in 
mechanical and electrical systems. In the application of FSA on planning VTS, it 
may be suitable to help analysing single failure modes causing onboard system 
failures such as radar, steering engine etc., that lead to marine casualty influencing 
the risk level in the planned area.  
 
FMEA only analyses the effects of a single component failure; it can identify single 
failure modes that may cause system failure, however it is not possible to analyse the 
problems caused by combinations of component failures. In addition, FMEA focuses 
on how equipment failure can occur, those human factors, external influences that do 
not cause equipment failure are often overlooked although they may present dangers 
directly to human beings or the system as a whole (USCG, 2005).  
 
• Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP)       
 
HAZOP is a qualitative method used to analyse hazards in a system with the aim to 
eliminate or minimise them. It uses “guidewords” to identify hazards and studies 
deviations from the design objectives of a system and components in order to seek 
answers to the causes and consequences of these deviations and how to eliminate or 
defend them. Dickson (1987) developed a sheet for HAZOP to record the findings of 
the analysis under columns for guidewords, deviation, cause, consequences and 
actions. Table 4 is an example of the sheet for HAZOP:  
 
Table 4: Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP)  
Guidewords Deviations Causes Consequences Actions 
No No flow tank empty, no petrol gets to vehicles, regular checking of tank, 
    inlet valve V1 is shut, petrol seeps out of pipes, vavles to be checked everyday, 
    pump is not working, hose bursts. regular maintenance of the pump.
    hose blocked.     
Source: Dickson (1987) 
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HAZOP is used primarily for systems with a continuous process, especially fluid, air 
and thermal systems. Its disadvantages are that it requires a well-defined system; 
investment of time is expensive; in case the system is simplified to facilitate the 
study, there is the risk that certain aspects may be omitted; and it focuses only on 
identifying single failure so that it is not able to analyse failure caused by a 
combination of events (Xie, 2001).   
 
• What-if analysis technique 
 
What-if analysis is a brainstorming approach that uses broad, loosely structured 
questioning, for instance, “what if the relieve valve fails to open?” and suchlike 
queries, to assume potential failures that may result in accidents or system 
performance problems and ensure that appropriate safeguards against those problems 
are in place.  
 
As a qualitative technique, it may be generally applicable for almost every type of 
risk assessment application, especially those dominated by relatively simple failure 
scenarios but is most often used to supplement other, more structured risk analysis 
techniques. In addition, the loose structure of what-if analysis relies exclusively on 
the knowledge of the participants to identify potential problems. If the team fails to 
ask important questions, the analysis is likely to overlook potentially important 
weaknesses (USCG, 2005).  
 
• Risk contribution tree (RCT) 
 
RCT may be used as a mechanism for displaying diagrammatically the distribution 
of risk amongst different accident categories and sub-categories. Structuring the tree 
starts with the accident categories, which may be divided into sub-categories to the 
extent that available data allow and logic dictates. The preliminary fault and event 
trees can be developed based on the hazards identified in step 1 to demonstrate how 
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direct causes initiate and combine to cause accidents (using fault trees), and also how 
accidents may progress further to result in different magnitudes of loss (using event 
trees) (IMO, 2002). One example is attached, as shown in Figure 16, to illustrate how 
to use this approach in the phase of risk analysis for planning VTS.  
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Figure 16: Risk contribution tree (RCT) for planning VTS 
Source: Based on IMO’s model. (2002). 
 
Comparing the above models, RCT would be the more appropriate provided that 
these models are singly used for risk analysis of the planned area, because one RCT 
can deal with all accident categories which need to be analysed in planning VTS. 
However, the outcome of RCT consists of different risk levels brought about by 
different categories of marine accidents, which are measured by two parameters 
including probability and consequence. The question of how to integrate these risk 
levels corresponding to different categories of accidents into a comprehensive risk 
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level for the planned area, which will determine the acceptability of stakeholders, is 
still not answered.      
 
3.1.2 Risk index approach for risk estimation 
 
From the above introduction, it can be put forward that these models may be used for 
risk estimation in planning VTS to some extent, nevertheless with their peculiar 
drawbacks and limitation, they are all appropriate especially to relatively small and 
simple projects instead of large and complicated ones such as VTS, if they are used 
singly, because what each of them can bring to light is just a tiny corner of the 
iceberg compared with the whole scenario that needs to be researched in planning for 
a VTS. Although it is theoretically feasible that risk estimation for planning VTS is 
conducted through a combination of these models, the process would be 
tremendously wearisome and miscellaneous so that analysts easily lose their way in 
so complex a wordplay and figure game. Therefore it is necessary to seek a new 
model exclusively for risk estimation for planning for a VTS. 
 
The so-called risk estimation virtually predicts the future risk in a planned area which 
can be conducted through two distinct schools, where one uses the past to predict the 
future by analysing historical data whereas the other predicts the future qualitatively 
and / or quantitatively with the aid of mathematical models or expert experience and 
judgement. However as far as the latter is concerned, the establishment of models 
and expert views are actually still based on previous or historical experience as well, 
so they have a common character in this point with the former. Both of them are 
dominated by unpredictable uncertainty to some extent. 
 
In step 1 of FSA, the local traffic hazards, including traffic volume, main max of 
traffic, local geographical conditions, hydro/meteo, dangerous cargoes and marine 
pollution, are identified and it is easily understood that a combination of them 
approximately determines the local traffic risk level. In these six factors, traffic 
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volume in a defined area always varies with the fluctuation of the maritime industry 
while others keep relatively unchanged over a period. So it can be said that variety in 
traffic volume is a crucial factor influencing the change of risk level in a defined area 
and there should also be a close correlation between traffic volume and risk level. 
This conclusion can be given support to by many experts’ opinions and statistical 
data, including the Wuhan Port scenario.  
 
In his book, Wu (1992) put forward an approach called the risk index theory, which 
can be easily implemented and has a fairly good operability and comparability. The 
theory states that the traffic risk state in an area in a period can be measured by the 
ratio of numbers of marine accidents and traffic volume in the area in the period: 
 
R = P / Q        (R: risk index;  P: numbers of marine accidents;  Q: traffic volume) 
     
Contact, grounding, contact bridge, hitting rock and wave damage etc. can be all 
regarded as collisions between ship and stationary objects. Thus nearly all marine 
traffic accidents can be classified into collision. Qiu (1991) cites a formula, as 
follows, from a scholar studying the collisions between gas molecules to illustrate the 
relationship between vessel traffic density and the number of collisions: 
                                 

 −
−= maxmax
exp ρ
ρ
ρρ
ρ
V
CKVP        
  
P: number of collisions; 
V: ships’ mean speed; 
ρ: vessel traffic density; 
ρmax : maximum vessel traffic density; 
K: domain coefficient 1; 
C: domain coefficient 2. 
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Figure 17: Relation between vessel traffic density and the number of collisions 
Source: Based on Qiu’ formula. (1991). 
 
Figure 17 describes the formula showing that number of collisions P will increase 
with the traffic density ρ (nearly linear relation) especially when ρ is not too much 
(when ρ ranges from 0 ~ ρx). This obvious correlation between P and ρ can justify  
Wu’s theory that traffic risk state in an area in a period can be measured by the ratio 
of numbers of marine accidents and traffic volume in the area in the period. 
 
As, in a planned area, there exists much diversification in respect of ships’ categories 
and sizes as well as traffic accidents’ categories, scale and loss, it is necessary to 
weight the traffic volume and number of traffic accidents in order to more 
objectively reflect and describe the risk state in a planned area over a period. 
 
3.1.2.1 Weighted vessel traffic volume Qk   
 
Each ship is given a weighted coefficient according to its size (length or tonnage) 
and the sum of the weighted coefficients for all ships stands for the weighted vessel 
traffic volume QK in the area. Table 5 shows the weighted coefficients that can be 
used in the Wuhan Port case.             
          
54 
         Table 5: Weighted coefficient according to ship’s size 
ship's length(LOA: m) 0~<10 10~<30 30~<50 50~<75 75~<100 
weighted coefficient 0.25 0.5 1 1.18 1.41 
      
ship's length(LOA: m) 100~<150 150~<200 200~<250 250~<300 300~ 
weighted coefficient 1.7 2 2.5 3 4 
         Source: Based on Wu’ risk index theory. (1992). 
 
3.1.2.2 Weighted number of traffic accidents Pk 
                                                  ∑
=
=
5
1j
jjk PfP
j: accident classification ( 1 ~ 5 ); 
fj : weighted coefficient for No.j class of accident; 
Pj: number of No.j class of accidents happening in the area.          
 
Table 6: Weighted coefficient according to accident’ severity 
accident classification ( j) 1 2 3 4 5 
severity catastrophic severe significant medium minor 
weighted coefficient ( fj ) 10 6 4 1 0.5 
 Source: Based on Wu’ risk index theory. (1992). 
  
The division of severity, as developed by the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency 
(1991), and referred to in Table 7, defines casualties, where a represents the loss of 
ship and cargo, b stands for amount of oil spilled and c indicates the number of life 
loss. If the following formula is reached, the casualty will be defined as a relevant 
classification: 
                                                 1/// ≥++ CcBbAa  
 
This method for division can be easily conducted. In addition, it gives consideration 
to the marine environmental protection through putting the oil spilled quantitatively 
into the ingredient of accidents.      
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Table 7: Defining casualties 
severity / accident categories 
total loss A   
(GT) 
amount of oil spilled B     
(Kl) 
loss of life C    
(person) 
catastrophic 20000 20000 20 
severe 3000 3000 5 
significant 500 500 1 
medium 100 100 injure 
minor 20 20 ….. 
Source: Japanese Maritime Safety Agency. (1991). 
 
As far as planning for a VTS is concerned, the risk level is also influenced by vessel 
traffic efficiency because high efficiency is one of the goals that establishing a VTS 
pursues. In most circumstances, traffic efficiency is compromised by poor visibility, 
however its consequence can hardly be calculated precisely. One of the solutions is 
to count up the number of fog days per year and regard one fog-day as a medium 
marine casualty.  
 
3.1.2.3 Risk index 
 
To sum up, the risk index in a planned area over a period can be obtained through: 
k
j
jj
K
k
Q
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P
R
∑
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1  
Figure 18 and Table 8 show the risk index in Wuhan Port, which is calculated 
according to the data available from 1999 to 2003. The trendline for these data can 
be expressed as the formula: y = 1.4448x, on the basis of which, QK and Pk for the 
next five years (2005 ~ 2009) can be estimated as shown in Table 8, assuming that 
QK rises 2% per year from 2003.   
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Figure 18: Risk index in Wuhan Port (1999-2003) 
 
Table 8: Weighted traffic volume and number of traffic accidents in Wuhan Port 
year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Pk 62 66 53 82 63.5 71.7 73.1 74.6 76.1 77.6 
 QK   ( X104 ) 44.3671 45.3308 42.723 46.2745 47.6921 49.6189 50.6112 51.6235 52.6559 53.7091
 
 
3.2 Risk evaluation 
 
Once the risk level has been estimated, its result will be evaluated in terms of risk 
acceptance criteria in order to determine whether further measures should be taken to 
reduce the estimated risk level to the level that stakeholders are satisfied with. In its 
guideline, IALA (2000) states that:  
 
The purpose of risk evaluation is to identify the distribution of risk, thus 
allowing attention to be focused upon high-risk areas, and to identify and 
evaluate the factors, which influence the level of risk. The risks, as estimated 
in section B.2.1, are evaluated in terms of the needs, issues, and concerns of 
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stakeholders, the benefits of the activity, and its costs. The result of this 
exercise is a determination of the acceptability of these risks. 
 
The current best practice is to recognize that there are three levels of risk in terms of 
division of risk acceptability: intolerable, as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) 
and negligible (IMO, 2002) :  
• Intolerable — The risk is very high and cannot be justified except in 
extraordinary circumstances so that measures have to be taken to reduce risk 
level regardless of cost. 
• Negligible — The risk has been made so small that neither further precaution 
nor risk reduction is necessary. 
• ALARP — The risk falls between the above two states. It is also called 
Tolerable level, meaning that the risk is tolerable in this region. Risk reduction 
measures may or may not be taken depending upon the cost-benefit analysis of 
them. If the risk reduction measure is cost-effective, it should be taken to 
reduce the risk as low as reasonably practicable, on the contrary, no action 
needs to be taken to reduce the risk (Xie, 2001).  
This concept can be illustrated in Figure 19 (IALA, 2000).     
 FREQUENCY 
     
K1 
Frequent 
Intolerable 
Reasonably  
Probable 
ALARP 
Remote 
K2 Extremely 
Remote 
Negligible 
Major Catastrophic 
CONSEQUENCE 
Insignificant Minor 
 
Figure 19: ALARP Matrix 
Source: IALA. (2000).
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3.2.1 Stakeholders involved in planning VTS 
 
In risk evaluation, the criteria of risk acceptability/tolerability depend on the needs, 
issues and concerns of the stakeholders. Due to discrepancies in respect of social and 
economic development, political system, administrative philosophy as well as public 
awareness, different stakeholders may be involved in planning VTS in different 
states, and even in a country, each stakeholder has its own rights, duties and 
responsibilities, interests and value preference. So it is very tough to model these 
needs, issues and concerns in a satisfactory way and in a uniform mode in terms of 
the world.    
 
With the rapid increase in coastal and ocean uses, as well as those inland activities 
having effects on ocean and coastal environments, which can possibly conflict each 
other, the establishment of VTS is not merely the business of the shipping industry 
and maritime administration but also involves other parties such as fisheries, 
mariculture, mining, offshore oil and tourism etc. because they could be the 
beneficiaries or investors of VTS, or be affected by implementing VTS.  
 
In the early 1990’s, a new concept of integrated coastal and ocean management 
(ICOM) came into existence, which can be defined as a continuous and dynamic 
process to ensure that the decisions of all sectors (e.g., fisheries, shipping, water 
quality) and all levels of government are harmonized and consistent with the coastal 
policies of the nations in question for the sustainable use, development, and 
protection of coastal and marine areas and resources (Cincin-Sain & Knecht, 1998). 
In this principle, decision makers for planning VTS should take into account four 
aspects of integrations: intersectoral, intergovernmental, spatial and international in 
order to develop an integrated criterion of risk acceptability for the planned area. 
 
Intersectoral integration involves the harmonization of interests and solution of 
conflicts between relevant marine sectors, coastal sectors and land-based sectors. For 
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instance, establishing VTS can contribute to marine environmental protection which 
is beneficial to fisheries, however fishing boats might have to be restricted by the 
VTS rules. Spatial integration involves integration between ocean activities and land-
based activities. They may influence or be dependent on each other and need to 
achieve compatible goals and policies. Intergovernmental integration intends to deal 
with those problems arising due to different roles, public needs and perspectives 
among different levels of government (national, provincial, local) while the 
international integration should take place when planning VTS involves multiple 
states. VTS in the Malacca Strait is a good example of international integration, 
which is an outcome of a three-state cooperation: Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.  
 
3.2.2 Risk Perceptions            
 
Theoretically, the stakeholders’ acceptability of risk can be expressed by a straight 
line which crosses the two points K1 and K2 in the above ALARP Matrix. It is mainly 
affected by risk perception. Royal Society Study Group (1992) states: “From the 
perspective of the social sciences, risk perception involves people’s beliefs, attitudes, 
judgements and feelings, as well as the wider social or cultural values and 
dispositions that people adopt, towards hazards and their benefits.”  
 
Different stakeholders have different risk perceptions. For example, in planning 
VTS, the port authority may mainly focus on the influence on traffic efficiency by 
bad visibility whereas tourism may emphasize the risks caused by marine pollution; 
among the decision-maker team, technical experts are inclined to form their own 
perception according to technical factors such as the probability of traffic accidents 
and their impact on navigation safety and the marine environment while the public’s 
perception of risk may be influenced by many things, including age, gender, region, 
value, level of education, public opinion, time and previous serious hazards. 
Therefore, it is necessary to create an integrated and accepted risk perception for all 
the concerned stakeholders in order to determine the criterion of risk acceptability.  
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Although it may not be suitable to achieve the criterion for planning for a VTS in 
inflexible rules, as far as risk criteria for ships are concerned there are still some 
principles that can be complied with:  
(1) the activity should not impose any risks which can reasonably be avoided; 
(2) the risks should not be disproportionate to the benefits; 
(3) the risks should not be unduly concentrated on particular individuals; 
(4) the risks of catastrophic accidents should be a small proportion of the total. 
                                                                                                     (Spouse 1997) 
 
3.2.3 Evaluation of risk acceptability/tolerability  
 
In the step of risk estimation, the risk state in a planned area can be described by the 
risk index that includes two parameters QK and Pk. Both of them cannot be used 
directly in the ALARP Matrix because its two axes respectively represent Frequency 
and Consequence and the Matrix is especially appropriate to illustrate the risk level 
that results from an accident or a category of accidents instead of an integrated risk 
level that is reflected by all relevant accidents in a planned area and can be used in 
planning VTS. So the ALARP Matrix needs to be transformed into a new model for 
its application when planning for a VTS. 
 
In the ALARP Matrix, the horizontal axis (Consequence) has the same implication 
as the weighted number of traffic accidents (Pk) because Pk is calculated according 
to two categories of scenarios: number of traffic accidents and their impacts. The 
vertical axis (Frequency) has a close relationship with the weighted vessel traffic 
volume (Qk): the more the traffic volume, the less the Frequency. Therefore, the 
Matrix can be changed as shown in Figure 20: 
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W4 (x4 ,  y4) 
(x3 , y3) W3 
W2 (x2 ,  y2) 
W1 (0, y1) 
Intolerable 
ALARP 
Negligible 
Qk 
Trendline 
 (y = 1.4448x, in Wuhan Port case) 
Figure 20: ALARP Matrix based on risk index  
  
In Figure 20, the coordinates of Point W1 and W2 can be determined by the decision-
makers according to their risk perception. Point W2 means that once Pk is more than 
y2 , the risk level in the planned area is absolutely intolerable no matter how much Qk 
is. Point W4 means that once Pk is less than y4, the risk level in the planned area is 
negligible no matter how little Qk is. The formula of the straight line crossing Point 
W1 and W2 can be indicated as: 
                        
1
2
12 yx
x
yy
y +•−=  
In the Wuhan Port case, its trendline could intersect with the straight line at Point 
W3, the horizontal coordinate of which is calculated as: x3 = y1 x2  /(1.4448x2 + y1 - 
y2). So, quantitatively, provided that the estimated Qk per year (2005 ~ 2009) in 
Wuhan Port is above the value of x3, the risk level for the next five years will fall 
into an intolerable degree theoretically, then the process of FSA will have to proceed 
to Step 3 for specifying the risk control options.         
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Risk control options 
 
In Chapter 3 a framework addressing risk analysis has been constructed, the ultimate 
purpose of which is to determine whether or not the risks identified in Step 1 of FSA 
will be accepted by stakeholders related to planning for a VTS. There will be one of 
three types of outcome resulting from the above risk analysis exercise. If the decision 
makers draw a conclusion that the risk level in a planned area is acceptable, then the 
FSA process ends here and no further action is necessary other than reviewing the 
risk level in the area periodically. If the risk level is considered intolerable, or it is 
necessary to take cost-effective measures to reduce it although it is tolerable, the 
FSA will initiate Step 3 — Risk Control Options (RCOs) to develop new risk 
reduction measures. In its guidelines, IMO (2002) states that the purpose of Step 3 is 
to propose effective and practical RCOs, which comprises the following four 
principal stages: 
.1   focusing on risk areas needing control; 
.2   identifying potential risk control measures (RCMs); 
.3  evaluating the effectiveness of the RCMs in reducing risk by re-evaluating 
step 2; and 
.4  grouping RCMs into practical regulatory options. 
 
4.1 Areas needing control 
 
When decision-makers plan for a VTS, the area that they are concerned with might 
be so large that it is impossible or unnecessary to establish VTS covering the whole 
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area due to the limitation of the resources and budgets. Therefore, the risk control 
options must be given priority in the areas most needing risk control so that the 
planned VTS can generate its functions to a greater extent and the risk level in whole 
area can be improved more effectively.  
 
In Step 1 of FSA, the whole water area studied can be geographically divided into 
several sub-areas, and ranked according to the identified hazards or historical traffic 
data. In Step 2, the risk indices in these sub-areas are also calculated respectively 
and it is easily understood that the sub-area with a higher risk index has a higher risk 
level. Generally, the outcome in the form of a prioritized list of sub-areas from these 
two steps is consistent and the area most needing risk control can be obviously 
identified. If the results conflict, the decision-makers have to make an assessment of 
which sub-area has the highest priority at their discretion through comparing their 
importance between the sub-area having the highest probability of accident 
occurrence and the sub-area contributing to the highest severity outcomes.                 
 
4.2 Alternative risk control options 
 
By reviewing the definition of risk and a pair of factors influencing the risk level, 
risk control measures can be classified into two groups: preventive measures and 
mitigating measures. Preventive measures are designed to reduce the likelihood of 
failures and accidents, in short, control the frequency, whereas mitigating measures 
aim at reducing the severity of failures and accidents, in short, controlling the 
escalation of failures and accidents when they have happened (IMO, 1997).  
 
Figure 21, created by Hahne & Galle (1993), illustrates how measures to safeguard 
safety in shipping are categorized more in detail. There are wide means available to 
the maritime industry for improving safety levels, for instance, from international 
legislation to company management, from land based systems to ships’ design and 
construction etc.  
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As far as VTS is concerned, it is not only a kind of land based safety system but also 
a method of doing waterways management. So when planning for a VTS, decision-
makers should specify the risk control options in the range of waterways 
management instead of those broad-sense measures mentioned above.  
 
In the planned area, reduction of the risk level may be achieved by implementing 
waterways management that also can be divided into preventive measures and 
mitigating measures. Preventive measures mainly refer to a land-based safety system 
which includes passive systems and active systems. Passive systems are systems 
where there is no action required to deliver the risk control measures and the 
involved ships self-consciously comply with the requirements of systems, for 
instance buoyancy, ship routing and traffic rules etc. Active systems are systems 
where the risk control is provided by the action of safety facility or operators and the 
involved ships receive the services or instructions from systems, such as ship 
reporting, pilotage, VTS and so on. Mitigating measures are taken to reduce the 
severity of the outcome of the event or subsequent events when they occur. Typical 
examples are Search and Rescue (SAR), Contingency Plans, Places of Refuge, 
Maritime Assistance Service, Particular Sensitivity Sea Area (PSSA) etc.  
 
Although both kinds of measures can contribute to risk reduction, one is proactive 
whereas the other is reactive. Proactive means the identification of factors at an early 
stage that may adversely affect maritime safety and the immediate development of 
regulatory action to prevent undesirable events, as opposed to just an after-the-fact 
ad-hoc reaction to a single accident. Methodologies such as FSA are considered as 
prime instruments for the development of proactive policies (Psaraftis, 2002).   
 
When planning for a VTS, decision makers may confront two questions. Firstly, 
those options in waterways management can be in favour of safety in a planned area 
to some extent, however, which contributes most or is the most cost-effective? 
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Secondly, is there one option which is adequate to reduce the risk to a level which 
the stakeholders can be satisfied with or is it necessary to take a combined measure?  
 
Compared with other options in the context of waterways management, VTS has its 
distinctive advantages. VTS can play a role that overlaps with both preventive 
measures and mitigating measures. Through providing the information and services 
as well as monitoring the vessels’ movement, VTS results in the decline of accident 
probability. Moreover, through attending the support of allied services or Search and 
Rescue, VTS can contribute in blocking the escalation of accidents happening in the 
VTS area. In particular, operators of VTS can remind crew on board of the coming 
dangers or even give warning messages / instructions if necessary; VTS can also 
ensure traffic safety and efficiency, especially in bad visibility etc. These functions 
are exclusively offered by VTS rather than through other options in waterways 
management. 
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Figure 21: Measures to ensure safety in shipping 
 Source:  Hahne & Galle (1993) 
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Consequently, when applying FSA in the stage of planning for a VTS, decision-
makers should make clear three issues:  
1. Suitability; is VTS able to reduce the risk level in the planned area 
significantly?  
2. Optimization; is it the most appropriate method or the first option?  
3. Effectiveness; is it adequate or need it be complemented by other options? 
                 
4.3 Identifying risk control options 
 
A structured review model ought to be created for identifying new risk control 
options for risks that are not sufficiently suppressed by the existing measures. The 
core part of this model is to find out the risk attributes and underlying factors of 
accidents. Risk attributes relate to how a measure might control a risk and the prime 
purpose of assigning attributes is to facilitate a structured thought process to 
understand how a risk control option works, how it is applied and how it would 
operate (IMO, 2002). Underlying factors relate to how and why accidents have 
happened so that risk control can be introduced and stop them happening again. 
 
In step 1 of FSA, collected historical traffic accident data has been used to categorize 
and prioritize them and form a prioritized list of risks. Then aiming at different types 
of accidents such as collision, grounding and contact etc., marine incident 
investigation, with the incorporation of the human element, is respectively conducted 
to uncover a group of underlying factors for each type of accident and prioritize these 
factors according to their influence on system failure. The outcome is a prioritized 
list of underlying factors for each type of accident in the planned area.  
 
Commonly, different types of traffic accidents may have similar underlying factors. 
For instance, collision, grounding and contact all might be caused by a crew’s lack of 
a proper look-out or fatigue. So the next step when specifying RCOs is to combine 
and prioritize those identified underlying factors into a list of factors, then put 
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forward a relevant group of RCOs for each factor. For different factors, there might 
be similar measures which can be taken to defend the system. For example, both 
VTS and pilotage services can counteract the influence of a crew’s lack of a proper 
look-out or fatigue to some extent. Eventually, all specified RCOs in all groups are 
combined into a list of RCOs. This list includes the suggested options that cover all 
the identified underlying factors. The above principle for specifying risk control 
options is illustrated, as shown in Figure 22.        
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Figure 22: Specify risk control options 
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4.4 Marine incident investigation 
 
Under IMO conventions each flag State has a duty to conduct an investigation into 
any casualty occurring to any of its ships when it judges that such an investigation 
may assist in determining what changes in the present regulations may be desirable 
while under UNCLOS where a casualty occurs within the territorial sea or internal 
waters of a State, that State has a right to investigate the cause of any such casualty 
which might pose a risk to life or the environment, involve the coastal State’s SAR 
authorities, or otherwise affect the coastal State (IMO, 1997). From this point of 
view, marine incident investigation may assist in determining whether the 
establishment of a VTS is justified in the planned area. In the context of waterways 
management, the objective of the investigation is to prevent similar accidents in the 
future through adopting appropriate risk control options for waterways management.  
 
Needless to say, the human element plays an important role in the origin of 
accidents, and it is commonly thought that about eighty percent of transport accidents 
involve the human element while even some specialists claim that all accidents 
involve the human factor ultimately. Consequently, human element issues should be 
systematically incorporated into the FSA framework, associating them directly with 
the occurrence of incidents and underlying causes. 
 
In 1997, IMO adopted the Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and 
Incidents. The Code was amended in 1999 to provide practical advice for systematic 
investigation of human factors in marine casualties and incidents. This instrument 
can be used by decision makers when planning VTS to develop an applicable 
framework to identify all the possible underlying factors leading to accidents in 
planned areas so that corresponding risk control options can be figured out logically.     
 
• SHEL model 
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The SHEL Model was originally developed by Edwards and modified later by 
Hawkins. It has been considered to be a useful means of defining information 
requirements during an occurrence investigation. Once the information requirements 
are identified, the investigator can gather the facts from appropriate sources (IMO, 
2000). There are four components to the model: Liveware, Hardware, Software and 
Environment.  
 
The SHEL Model is commonly depicted graphically
 
to display, not only the four 
components, but also the relationships, or interfaces, between the Liveware and all 
the other components. A mismatch of the interface can be a source of human error 
and identification of a mismatch may be the identification of a safety deficiency in 
the system (IMO, 1999). 
 
In planning VTS, the purpose of the SHEL model is to assist decision-makers to 
understand the types of human interaction with environment where a person is 
working. It helps to get information concerning “what, where, when and who 
happened” and identify influencing factors on each type of interfacing rather than 
explaining how or why accidents have occurred. 
 
In 2002, Kawano created the m-SHEL model, as shown in Figure 23, that is a 
variation of the SHEL model and adds "m- (management)", which represents the 
control of whole system, to the SHEL model. In their article, Itoh & Mitomo apply 
the m-SHEL model for analysis of human factors at ship operation. They highlighted 
the interface between liveware and management, which involved four aspects: duties 
of employers and captains, duties of politics, hand skills on to the next generation as 
well as accumulation, analysis, and sharing of experiences (Itoh & Mitomo, 2004). In 
planning VTS, this model should be taken into account so that decision-makers can 
be aware of the interface between crew on board and existing land based safety 
system.  
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 Figure 23: m-SHEL model 
Source: Itoh & Mitomo. (2004).   
 
• Reason Model 
 
Although there are many different accident causation theories in use, the one which 
has been used most extensively is that of James Reason, based on the theories by 
Rasmussen et al. In order to analyse the causes of accidents, a theoretical framework 
that can be applied to events is needed. This framework can provide a theoretical 
basis for both the understanding of the causes of accidents and for the invention of 
practical remedial actions. For this framework to have credibility, it must lead to the 
improved remediation or prevention of incidents (Gordon & Mearns, 2000). Maurino 
et al (1995) states that all technological systems have the following common 
processes: organisational processes, local working conditions and defences, barriers 
and safeguards.  
 
Reason’s model, utilizing a production framework and facilitating further 
organization of the data collected by using the SHEL model, can be used by an 
investigator as a guide to developing an occurrence sequence in the way of arranging 
the information regarding the occurrence of events and circumstances around one of 
five production elements, i.e., decision makers, line management, preconditions, 
productive activities, and defense (IMO, 1999). On the basis of the Reason Model, a 
new one can be conceived to be applied when planning for a VTS. This should help 
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the decision-makers highlight the deficiencies and insufficiencies in waterways 
management in order to figure out new risk control options. This model is illustrated 
in Figure 24.          
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 Figure 24: Model for highlighting the deficiencies and insufficiency 
                 in waterways management  
Source: Based on the Reason Model. (1999).
 
 
 
The principle of this model is that the whole system could be protected by defences 
(waterways management) and feedback loops from all system levels safeguarding the 
safety of the system. Human deficiencies result from the environment where one is 
working, and psychological precursors of unsafe acts (fatigue, stress etc.) in 
combination with the unsafe act lead to a limited window of accident opportunity, 
which might trigger an accident, if adequate waterways management is unavailable. 
The following case elaborates this theory.   
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 On a night during the 1970’s, a passenger ferry sunk in Japanese coastal waters after 
hitting a rock causing a serious fatality. The investigation report showed that the 
primary cause was the crew’s lack of a valid look-out and recommended reminding 
crews of navigating cautiously in that area. Unfortunately, ten years later a similar 
casualty occurred again. The investigation indicated that in the first several years 
after the previous accident, the crew really operated with vigilance in that area. 
However in the course of time, the lesson from this incident was neglected 
unconsciously by seafarers and a similar cause led to similar accident once more. 
Later a lighthouse was installed on the rock and this kind of incident has not occurred 
since. An application of the model on this case for specifying risk control options is 
illustrated in Figure 25:   
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Figure 25: Model of a passenger ferry accident 
 
From the above example, it can be concluded that the installation of a lighthouse 
could contribute to protecting the system at all levels. So a lighthouse should be 
considered as an identified risk control option. Similarly, VTS could also play an 
important role to prevent such accidents from happening in this respect.  
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The above model is an accident causation model while SHEL is a model that simply 
explains the types of human interaction without putting them into a context. In this 
step of FSA, these two models should be complementary to each other in order to 
facilitate decision-makers in finding out the appropriate risk control options for a 
planned area.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and recommendations for decision-making 
 
In the previous chapter, Step 3 implies the development of Risk Control Options, 
which contain a limited number of Risk Control Measures (RCMs) for particular risk 
scenarios ranked by importance. These RCOs could be designed either to control the 
likelihood of initiation of accidents or control the escalation of accidents. The scope 
of Step 3 is a set of RCOs assessed according to their effectiveness of reducing risk 
(Melendez, 2004). Hereafter, FSA will activate its Step 4 – Cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) to find the relation between the cost of the implementation of a RCO and the 
benefit obtained in terms of risk reduction.   
 
There are two major kinds of cost-benefit analysis and they are Ex ante CBA and Ex 
post CBA. In the process of FSA, the applied CBA commonly refers to the former, 
which is conducted while a project or policy is under consideration or before it is 
started or implemented. On the contrary, the latter is done at the end of a project. Ex 
ante CBA assists in making the decision about whether scarce resources should be 
allocated by stakeholders to a specific project or policy and how to facilitate more 
efficient allocation (Boardman & Greenberg, 2001).      
 
A VTS system is expensive to build and operate. It is necessary to conduct an 
extensive CBA to justify such large public and/or private investments. In its VTS 
Manual, IALA (2002) states that:  
Even if not all costs and benefits can be translated into monetary terms the 
CBA can assist in a more complete and rational decision-making process. It 
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can also contribute to the proper allocation of the cost recovery by the various 
benefiting parties, as well as the determination of the system requirements.    
Such a CBA forms an integral and essential part of the whole process for the 
application of FSA on planning VTS.  
 
In the last step, several risk control options may have been specified. The CBA 
would ensure the balance among these risk control options. The principle is that if 
the cost of a RCO outweighs its benefit, the improved safety or the reduced risk that 
such a “cost” achieves, this RCO is not regarded as cost-effective, then it will be 
rejected unless the local risk level is considered intolerable.    
 
In its guidelines, IMO (2002) recommends the procedures for conducting a CBA, 
which may consist of the following stages: 
 
1. consider the risks assessed in step 2, both in terms of frequency and 
consequence, in order to define the base case in terms of risk levels of the 
situation under consideration; 
2. arrange the RCOs, defined in step 3, in the way to facilitate understanding of 
the costs and benefits resulting from the adoption of an RCO; 
3. estimate the pertinent costs and benefits for all RCOs; 
4. estimate and compare the cost effectiveness of each option, in terms of the 
cost per unit risk reduction by dividing the net cost by the risk reduction 
achieved as a result of implementing the option; and 
5. rank the RCOs from a cost-benefit perspective in order to facilitate the 
decision-making recommendations in step 5. 
 
This proposal may be used to develop a framework of conducting a CBA for 
planning for a VTS in order to determine whether the establishment of VTS in a 
planned area is justified or is the most cost-effective option among all the RCOs 
specified in the previous step. The following is a method which elaborates how to 
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implement VTS CBA, provided that VTS is one of the RCOs. This method may, in 
principle, also be applied on the CBA of other RCOs.  
 
5.1 Definition of interested parties  
 
The interested parties in this case can be defined as those who are directly or 
indirectly impacted by the existing risks or new risks generated by establishing VTS 
and those who intend to invest in a VTS or will benefit from the VTS. It is often 
contentious whether CBA should be conducted from an international, national, local 
or Maritime Administration perspective. In general, this poser may be solved 
according to the location and scale of the planned VTS, national maritime policy and 
administrative philosophy. When measuring the cost and benefit of a VTS, analysts 
may divide these interested parties into several groups and those in the same group 
may have common interests as far as the implementation of VTS in planned area is 
concerned.       
 
5.2 Catalogue the impacts of VTS and determine measurement units 
 
For a proposed RCO, its impacts can be classified as the anticipated beneficial 
impacts and the anticipated cost impacts. For a planned VTS, the anticipated 
beneficial impacts mainly include the time saved and reduced shipping costs for 
ships participating in a VTS (improvement of traffic efficiency); the residual value 
after the discounting period of 10 ~ 20 years; accidents avoided due to implementing 
VTS. The anticipated cost impacts are VTS construction costs and its additional 
maintenance and operational costs. All these impacts of VTS could be listed as 
benefits or costs in order to facilitate their measurement in the CBA. 
 
The risk reduction of implementing VTS can be calculated relative to the present 
safety level. In a previous step, the safety level in a planned area is expressed as the 
expected annual weighted number of traffic accidents Pk. The risk reduction 
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resulting from VTS can thus be expressed as the number of averted Pk if the option 
is implemented.  
 
The initial cost and its maintenance and the operating costs of VTS are estimated. By 
comparing all costs to the number of averted Pk , the costs of averting a standard 
weighted traffic accident can be computed. This number represents the cost-benefit 
of the planned VTS. When the costs of averting a standard weighted traffic accident 
have been calculated for all specified RCOs, decision-makers can possibly highlight 
an option which has the largest risk reduction for a certain amount spent.  
 
5.3 Predict the costs of VTS 
 
The objective of predicting the costs of VTS is to estimate the costs associated with 
implementing and operating the planned VTS. In its Manual, IALA (2002) sets out a 
framework for determining of the VTS costs: 
The cost components of a new VTS consist of two distinctive groups, namely 
the initial investment costs and the lifetime operating costs. Not only the costs 
for the VTS-organization need to be taken into consideration, but also the 
costs incurred by other parties. Often allied organizations and users need to 
invest to supply to or obtain information from VTS. All cost components 
should be identified and quantified, both in size (how much?) and time 
(when?). At the end of the lifetime of the VTS the investments might still 
have a residual value which needs to be deducted from the initial investment. 
 
The estimates can be based on literature surveys and experience from other VTSs 
which have been established where a large similarity exists between them and the 
planned VTS in terms of scale, type, the services provided, the functions performed 
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and location etc. Table 9 shows those items that should be taken into account and can 
be used in estimating the costs of the planned VTS. 
 
Table 9: VTS costs calculation  
VTS costs  cost items ( currency unit) VTS 1 VTS 2 VTS 3 · · · · · · ·  VTS n average costs
  research              
  feasibility study             
initial investment 1 tendering             
(planning phase) procurement             
  legislation              
  design             
  other costs             
  land acquisition             
  building works             
  equipment purchase              
initial investment 2 equipment installation              
(construction) spares purchase             
  recruitment of staff             
  training if staff             
  developing procedures             
  project management              
  other costs             
  maintenance and repairing of the building works              
  maintenance and repairing of the equipment             
operating costs salaries             
(operational phase) on-going training              
per year consumables             
  up-to-date equipment             
  other costs             
 
 
After the initial investment costs (Ci) and annual operating costs (Co) for a planned 
VTS are estimated, the total costs in the lifetime of the investment (Ct) can be 
expressed using the following formula:  
Ct  = Ci  + Co × n − CR 
n: the expected lifetime of the planned VTS (generally 10 ~ 20 years); 
CR: the expected residual value of the planned VTS after n years. 
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Due to the influence of interest rates, for more objectively evaluating the VTS costs, 
facilitating comparison of costs and benefits as well as treating all costs, whether 
incurred early or late in the whole lifetime of VTS, in an equitable manner, it is 
necessary to discount the above Ct to a fixed point in time, generally the assumed 
starting point of the project, then the discounted value of all costs during the lifetime 
of a VTS can be calculated as follows: 
Ct  = [ Ci  / (1 + k ) y ] + [ Co (( 1 + k) n − 1 ) / k ( 1+ k ) n ] − [ CR / ( 1 + k ) n ] 
     with:  
            k: interest rate 
            y: the expected building years of planned VTS 
             
5.4 Risk reduction factor  
 
The risk reduction factor can be defined as the expected weighted number of 
traffic accidents Pk after implementation of the VTS, divided by the estimated Pk 
without implementation of the VTS. Undoubtedly, this factor will lie between 0 and 
1. It is not possible to precisely measure this factor because of the impossibility of 
considering the same area and time period with and without the VTS. Therefore, 
assessment of risk reduction factors can be based on an analysis of the operational 
modes of the planned VTS, including its type, the services provided and the 
functions performed as well as on literature surveys and calculations (DMA, 2002).   
 
In its VTS Manual, IALA (2002) recommends four categories of approaches that can 
be used to assess the risk reduction factor for the discussed VTS: statistical 
evaluation of the existing situations and experiences (also elsewhere); consultation of 
experienced mariners, VTS-staff and consultants; mathematical models and 
simulation methods.  
 
The first two can be conducted easily, inexpensively and without requiring detailed 
information, but the subjective judgement and historical data statistics, however they 
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may achieve a result having a big deviation from the actual performance of a planned 
VTS due to different situations and scenarios. These assessments are mainly 
implemented in forms of literature surveys and questionnaire. For instance, 
Glansdorp (2005) made studies in Dutch ports and drew the conclusion that VTSs in 
Netherlands contribute to a risk reduction in the VTS areas by nearly 30%; some 
research indicates that a full VTS can reduce accidents in areas of high traffic density 
by 50% (IALA, 2002); Harrald & Merrick (2000) assessed risk reduction due to 
VTM (vessel traffic management) through consulting two expert panels consisting of 
8 licensed merchant mariners, 7 Coast Guard officers and 12 persons with knowledge 
of port operations, and concluded the overall ranking of the alternatives on a relative 
scale in risk reduction for the Norfolk/Hampton Roads area, as shown in Figure 26. 
These kinds of research outcomes and individual opinion can be used for reference 
by decision-makers in order to estimate the benefits of a planned VTS.   
                                     
 
Figure 26: Ranking of alternatives in risk reduction for Norfolk/Hampton Roads area 
Source: Harrald & Merrick. (2000). 
 
While the last two approaches have more objectivity and allow different individuals 
to offer generally more uniform assessment, they have to be done much more costly 
or complicatedly and their accuracy depends on whether the models that they use are 
accessible enough to reality. In some circumstances, even they may not be as reliable 
as the first two approaches, because, after all, the models cannot cover all influencing 
factors and correspond with reality perfectly. In other words, each suggested method 
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has its own advantages and disadvantages and a combination of them may be 
necessary, depending on the situation.     
 
5.5 Expected costs per averted weighted traffic accident for VTS  
 
In step 2 of FSA, the traffic risk state in an area is expressed by its risk index, which 
is the ratio of weighted number of traffic accidents Pk and weighted vessel traffic 
volume Qk in the area in a period. Then a trendline is developed in order to estimate 
the future risk index for the area. In addition, the expected future Qk can be 
predicted through analysing the future economic and trade development. Therefore, 
the expected total Pk in the lifetime of VTS without implementing any risk control 
option (P0) can be calculated according to the above outcomes. Assuming that the 
risk reduction factor for VTS is f, the expected total averted Pk in the lifetime of 
VTS due to implementing VTS (Pw) can be calculated as the following formula: 
Pw = P0 ( 1− f ) 
So the expected costs per averted Pk for VTS (RCO 1) can be calculated as: 
Cper 1 = Ct / Pw = Ct / P0 ( 1− f ) 
 
A significant item when calculating the expected costs per averted Pk for VTS lies 
in the question, which specified RCO is the most cost-effective. This can be 
answered through a comparison with those expected costs per averted Pk for other 
RCOs. Generally, the RCO with the lowest expected costs per averted Pk is the most 
cost-effective and is considered worth giving the highest adoption priority.  
 
For instance, when doing a risk analysis of navigational safety in Danish waters, the 
DMA (2002) computed the costs per averted spill oil for all identified RCOs. These 
RCOs were then ranked according to their cost-effectiveness, as shown in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27: Costs per averted spill for all RCOs in situation 2001 and 2008 in Danish waters       
Source: DMA. (2002). 
 
It is evident that the four most beneficial RCOs are Wider Drogden channel, Hatter 
area incorporated into VTS Great Belt, Dredging in Hatter main route and VTS 
Drogden. They would be the most attractive choices to the decision-makers.  
 
5.6 Estimate the benefits of VTS  
 
The risk reduction benefits that would be derived from implementing VTS and 
costed in the above step need to be estimated now. Nevertheless, directly predicting 
the benefits of VTS is probably the most difficult and problematic task in the entire 
process of FSA. To simplify the method of predicting the benefits of the future VTS, 
it is necessary to develop an indirect approach.  
 
In fact, all predictions are based on previous experience. The benefits of VTS can be 
comprehended as the costs of averted accidents which would be prevented because 
of adoption of the VTS. It can be assumed that the costs of per averted weighted 
accident equal to the costs of per occurred weighted accident in past years, which 
84 
can be calculated through dealing with historical accident data. So a thorny job 
(directly predicting the benefits of VTS) is translated into a relatively easy one 
(calculating the costs of occurred accidents in history). 
 
• Loss of life or injured 
 
Estimating the monetary worth of a human life is a sensitive issue, considering that 
occasionally, people are injured or die as a result of an accident. For the purpose of 
CBA, the value of a human life is inherently an estimate, one that is pondered upon 
regularly (IALA, 2002). 
 
Researchers have used several benefit estimation techniques to estimate the value of 
life. These techniques either indirectly estimate the “price” people must be paid to be 
willing to take, or accept, certain risks by observing their behaviour in markets for 
commodities that embody risks, or directly elicit these amounts with hypothetical 
survey questions (Boardman & Greenberg, 2001). Many experts and scholars create 
their own model for elaborating and discussing this issue.  
 
For instance, Miller, Fisher, Chestnut and Violette etc. (1999) estimate the value of 
life and injury costs in the United States through examining how much of a wage 
premium people working in risky jobs must be given to compensate them for the 
additional risks (Boardman & Greenberg, 2001). Figure 28 illustrates their research 
outcomes. 
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 Figure 28: Value of life and monetary injury costs 
rce: Miller, Fisher, Chestnut and Violette etc. (1999) / Boardman & Greenberg. (2001).  Sou
 
Mishan (1988) put forward a formula for calculating the economic worth of a 
person’s life (L) on the basis of discounting the person’s expected future earnings to 
the present, where Yt is the expected gross earnings of the person during the tth year, 
exclusive of any yields from his ownership of non-human capital. Ptτ is the 
probability in the current, or τth, year of the person being alive during the tth year, and 
r is the social rate of discount expected to rule during the tth year.   
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In his lecture, Friis-Hansen (2005) also estimated the socio-economical value of 
human life (Q) using the Life Quality Index, which combines gross national product 
per capita (G), life expectancy at birth (E) and working time (W): Q . WW EG −= 1
 
Besides the above models, there are also a lot of other methods available to measure 
the monetary worth of a human life. Decision-makers can select an appropriate one 
at their discretion.  
 
• Economic losses       
 
Economic losses can be divided into two groups, hard losses and soft losses. The 
former mainly includes those obvious, tangible and direct losses of or damage to 
properties, caused by accidents, and relevant repair and replacement costs. They can 
be measured relatively easily through reviewing the historical accident data.  
 
The latter mainly includes those associated indirect costs that may not be readily 
recognized, for example loss of earnings, loss of reputation, loss resulting from delay 
in the carriage by sea of cargo, passengers or their luggage, loss resulting from 
“down time” of both vessels and related shore based activities due to fog and other 
circumstances etc. These so-called soft losses should also be considered and 
translated into monetary terms. However, some factors are almost impossible to 
translate into monetary terms precisely, whereas they should at least be noted and 
mentioned in the outcome of the CBA so that decision-makers can make a more 
comprehensive analysis with these references (IALA, 2002). 
 
• Environmental pollution 
 
Similarly the costs of environmental pollution can be divided into two groups as 
well, tangible and intangible costs. The tangible costs include the direct costs of the 
accidents, costs of the Search-and-Rescue operation, those associated costs for clean-
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up operations including shoreline clean-up and recovery of sunken oil, all arising 
from the occurred accident. These costs can be calculated easily through reviewing 
the historical data and records. 
 
The intangible costs mainly include damage to public and ecological resources, the 
impact on the ecosystem and human health, the damage to public recreation areas 
and sustainable development, influence on the fishery industry, aquaculture and 
tourism, political costs etc. Some of these can be translated into monetary terms 
while others are almost impossible to be measured in monetary terms, so they should 
at least be noted and mentioned in the outcome of the CBA so that the decision-
makers can make a more comprehensive analysis with these references.   
 
5.7 Assessment of the worthiness for VTS  
 
From the above steps, the costs of accidents during the past years can be calculated, 
and then these costs are discounted to a fixed point in time, generally the assumed 
starting point of the project, in a manner similar to that of calculating the costs of 
VTS. If the outcome is divided by historical weighted number of traffic accidents 
Pk, then the costs of per occurred Pk will be achieved.      
 
Assessing the worthiness for a planned VTS can be made by comparing the costs of 
per occurred Pk to the expected costs per averted Pk. This knowledge is used 
together with political and other considerations to determine whether or not the 
planned VTS should be implemented (DMA, 2002).      
 
As a general principle, a VTS should be implemented if the expected costs per 
averted Pk are lower than the costs of per occurred Pk. 
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5.8 Recommendations for decision-making 
 
Output from the above steps can provide an objective answer for the question of 
whether the establishment of a VTS in a planned area is justified or worthwhile and 
how much its cost-effectiveness is. Similarly, the above principles and methods are 
also applicable to CBA of other identified RCOs. A comparison of their results can 
indicate which is the most cost-effective option among all RCOs. This facilitates and 
rationalizes the decision-making, and could be easily used by decision-makers 
without a requirement for specialist expertise.   
 
In the final step of FSA, recommendations for decision-making that interacts with 
each of the other steps of FSA, recommendations should be presented in a form 
which can be understood by all parties irrespective of their experience in the 
application of risk and cost benefit assessment and related techniques. Those 
submitting the results of an FSA process should provide timely and open access to 
relevant supporting documents and a reasonable opportunity for, and a mechanism 
to, incorporate comments (IMO, 2002).  
 
Generally, the recommendations are based upon the outcomes of previous steps: in 
Step 1, the comparison and ranking of all risks, hazards and sub-areas in the planned 
area; in Step 2, estimated Pk, Qk and risk indices for each sub-area as well as their 
risk acceptability; in Step 3, the ranking of the underlying causes of those identified 
risks and hazards in Step 1 and the corresponding specified risk control options; in 
Step 4, the comparison and ranking of RCOs as a function of associated costs and 
benefits. Additionally, decision-makers must always be aware of residual risk, which 
is defined as any risk left after the implementation of the designated risk control 
option(s), and if appropriate, loop back in the process to determine if it should be 
further reduced, as shown Figure 3.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 
6.1 Conclusions  
 
The main purpose of this dissertation is the introduction of RBDM techniques 
commonly used for planning VTS to evaluate whether establishing a VTS in a 
planned area is justified and cost-effective. This analysis requires a clear 
understanding of all the factors that the application of RBDM on planning VTS 
involves and the development of a RBDM framework based on these factors. This 
RBDM framework, the so-called FSA, serves as an adequate reference for the 
application of RBDM techniques on planning for a VTS.     
 
Traditional approaches to decision-making have been partly successful and RBDM 
should be introduced in order to more greatly contribute to the improvement of safety 
in maritime sectors. RBDM is a systematic and scientific process of making 
decisions. FSA is a practical framework of the application of RBDM in the maritime 
industry, which is constructed using several mutually related modules: the 
identification of risks and hazards, risk assessment, the specification of RCOs, CBA 
and recommendations. As a framework of proactive approaches, FSA is considered 
as a prime instrument for the development of proactive marine policies.         
 
The above chapters introduce some of the main concepts to be used in the process of 
doing a FSA when planning for a VTS. Firstly, the problems needing to be defined 
for establishing a VTS were highlighted and it was shown that they are mainly 
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related to six aspects: VTS vessels, types of VTS, traffic rules and regulations, risk to 
be considered, geographical boundaries and determination of risk, then the risks and 
hazards in the planned area were identified and ranked through analysing the 
historical traffic accident records and local traffic data.  
 
Secondly, after some models recommended by IMO for risk analysis and the 
limitation of their application on planning VTS had been briefly introduced, a new 
method based on the risk index theory of Wu was demonstrated. This method can be 
used to estimate the future weighted traffic volume and traffic accident loss. Then, a 
new model evolving from the traditional ALARP Matrix was introduced illustrating 
the risk acceptability using two parameters, traffic volume and traffic accident loss, 
instead of risk frequency and consequence.  
 
Thirdly, in specifying RCOs, the m-SHEL model developed from the SHEL model 
and a new model based on the Reason model were used. Their combination and 
mutual supplementation highlight the relevant RCOs, which are identified according 
to the underlying factors of traffic accidents, in the context of waterways 
management.  
 
Finally, the concept of cost-benefit analysis was presented through a prioritisation of 
the RCOs with respect to cost-effectiveness and the subjective criterion, which is a 
comparison of the costs per averted spill to the costs of the occurrence of a spill, for 
the determination of whether to implement an RCO. 
 
Based on the above concepts and analyses, some recommendations are then 
submitted to the decision-makers. Thus, a whole process of how to apply FSA when 
planning for a VTS was demonstrated. Each major project may be regarded as 
unique. Therefore, the detailed application of RBDM on planning for a VTS is 
definitely different from other maritime projects although the principles of RBDM 
are applicable and identical to all fields. Even, within various VTS projects, there are 
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many aspects which differ. However, the similarity on the principles, methods and 
purposes of planning and implementing each VTS means that it is possible and 
necessary to create a generally applicable methodology for RBDM when planning 
VTS. This dissertation presents a uniform scheme illustrating how to apply RBDM 
when planning for a VTS. 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
 
The real scale of VTSs, as well as the cost of their investment and operation, have 
expanded dramatically in recent decades. Such a large and expensive project indeed 
needs to be assessed with RBDM in order to determine whether or not it is justified. 
The RBDM approach presented in this thesis provides some other benefits which 
may prove far more important in the long term. These benefits include: 
 
• A more transparent process in decision-making, which can help the stakeholders 
to understand the necessity for the suggested risk control option(s) and 
determine whether to establish a VTS in the planned area. 
 
• Better and more definite risk perceptions that determine the risk criteria and 
acceptability, as well as their effects on planning for a VTS. 
 
• Through identifying the underlying factors of risk with the incorporation of the 
human element, safeguards could be proactively taken in order to prevent 
accidents from occurring; this facilitates the assessment of the appropriate mix 
of ways to reduce risk. 
 
• Documentation and integration of group knowledge which is usually composed 
of individual opinions and permits their reservation. 
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• Soundness testing of the assumptions in the future performance scenario of the 
planned VTS. 
 
• Feedback into the decision-making process in terms of the suggested ways of 
preventing or avoiding risks in the planned area.  
 
Taking into account the promotion of the application of RBDM when planning for a 
VTS, the author would like to propose the following recommendations: 
 
• Decision-makers must understand the limitation of risk-based decision-making, 
which is still a developing science. The uncertainty is inherent in the process of 
RBDM, which is a major limitation of this approach and affects people’s 
confidence in this approach. 
 
• RBDM mainly provides relevant information, associated analysis outcomes and 
recommendations instead of the defined solutions to risks and hazards.   
 
• Limited resources should be directed to the most severe risks in a cost-effective 
manner in order to create the maximum benefits. 
 
• Each suggested RCO should be based on a scientifically and technically credible 
risk analysis and cost-benefit analysis.  
 
• Each public agency that administers projects relating to navigational safety, 
marine environmental protection and traffic efficiency should undertake to 
establish regulatory and budgetary priorities to guarantee that the national 
resources are appropriately allocated. 
 
• It is necessary to develop standard procedures and models, which should be as 
uniform as possible, for the conduct of RBDM when planning for a VTS. 
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• Risk control options should be evaluated in terms of cost, benefits, residual 
risks, risk reduction factor as well as the associated uncertainties in data and 
methods used to assess risks. 
 
• Decision-makers must also be aware that the future is not a simple and linear 
extension of the existing situation, so more refined methods must be applied to 
assess the estimated risks including their consequences, for the upcoming years  
by taking into account all the foreseeable trends.  
 
• Ranking the RCOs with respect to cost-effectiveness presents a recommended 
implementation sequence if cost-effectiveness were the only criterion. There are, 
however, other criteria which affect the final choice of RCO, for instance 
political objectives, co-funding of measures with other interested parties, 
consideration of natural resources, flora and fauna, professional and industrial 
bodies and the public. They may also have an impact on the preferences of the 
decision-makers.     
 
• It is necessary to foster more advanced methodologies for assessing risks and 
mitigating the uncertainties of analysis, more enhanced information and data 
collection to improve the accuracy and relevancy of RBDM, and innovative risk 
control options to reduce risks to safety and the environment while increasing 
traffic efficiency to a greater extent. 
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Appendix  A 
 
Port Of Wuhan: a brief view 
 
Wuhan port, the second largest inland port in China, has the capability of handling 
over 30 million tons of cargo each year (Hubei Government, 2000). As a first-grade 
port open to the outside world, it serves not only the international sea-borne trade of 
the country with many boat lines leading directly to 14 countries and regions such as 
Russia, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Macau, but is also at the centre of Yangtze 
river shipping and the key pivotal point of transportation which greatly contributes to 
the establishment of logistics between the central-western parts of China and Chinese 
coastal areas. According to the statistical data, the annual freight volume of Wuhan 
Port is 24.32 million tons with an annual passenger-traffic volume of 5.55million 
passengers (Gotravel, 2005).  
 
Location 
 
The geographical position of Wuhan Port is 30°-33'N and 114°-19'E. The port is 
attached to Wuhan City with more than 8 million inhabitants, located in the middle 
of China - about 1,200kms from Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hong Kong. The 
city is the provincial capital of Hubei Province and a focal point for political, 
economic, scientific and cultural affairs for central China.   
 
The harbour area covers 122.45 square kms, including a land area of 1.75 square 
kms, while its water area is composed of the Yangtze river section (the southern bank 
of 140kms from Bangzhou Tou to Sanjiang Kou and the northern bank of 188kms 
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from Shuihong Kou to Bahe Kou) and the Hanjiang river section of 55kms from 
Xingou to the Hanjiang Estuary where the Hangjiang river, as a tributary of the 
Yangtze river, converges into it within the Yangtze river section of Wuhan Port. 
 
Harbour Facility  
 
Due to its unique geographical advantage, Wuhan has been known since ancient 
times for its thoroughfares and golden rivers leading to different regions inside China 
and to various countries around the world. With 615 docking berths, Wuhan Port is 
one of the biggest passenger and cargo ports along the Yangtze River. Passenger 
traffic at Wuhan Port ranks first among all inland river ports in the Yangtze Basin 
and its cargo traffic ranks third in volume, behind Shanghai and Nanjing. All-year 
round, 5,000 ton-vessels can use the port while 10,000 ton-vessels can berth 
alongside during the wet season (Jipin, 2005).  
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Appendix B 
 
Identification of risks and hazards in Wuhan Port 
 
1. The traffic volume per year (1999-2003) in Wuhan port and its distribution 
 
According to Formula 3, the traffic volume per year (1999-2003) in Wuhan port is 
estimated as 234904 while the volume per day is 643. With consideration to traffic 
properties in the dry and flood seasons and the local natural conditions, the visual 
surveys were undertaken continuously for four days respectively in May and 
November (1999-2003). The site was located in Wharf.22, on the opposite side of the 
river of which, a chimney in Guomiansi factory was selected as the reference target 
so that an observation line was kept vertical with the main traffic flow in the Yangtze 
River. The collected data consists of vessel classes, vessel sizes, going upstream or 
sailing downstream and the time when the vessel passed through the observation line. 
In addition, the internal traffic volume was obtained through investigating Wuhan 
Maritime Safety Administration records.  
 
Figures 29 and 30 describe the distribution of vessel sizes and classes in Wuhan port. 
They show that ships ranging from 30m to 75m in terms of length form the principal 
part of the traffic flow and possess 63.77 percent of the total volume. Vessels 
identified in visual surveys and records were categorised into eleven classes for the 
purpose of analysis and four main types including cargo ship, barge-fleet pushed by 
tug, working ship and ferry, contribute to 79 percent of all vessels.   
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Figure 29: Distribution of vessel sizes in Wuhan Port (visual surveys, 1999-2003) 
Source: Yangtze Maritime Safety Administration (2005). 
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Figure 30: Distribution of vessel classes in Wuhan Port (visual surveys and MSA 
records, 1999-2003) 
Source: Yangtze Maritime Safety Administration (2005).  
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2.  Main mix of traffic in Wuhan Port 
 
Wuhan Port is situated in the centre part of the Yangtze waters network comprising 
the main river and tributaries. Due to complicated geographical features and special 
traffic rules, there exists a large amount of altering course points and crossing traffic 
flows in the whole area. The main mixes of traffic in Wuhan Port occur in sailing 
cross areas and where ferry services are provided. As the above mentioned, sailing 
cross areas increase the probability of ship cross encounters and collisions. In its 
investigation report, Changjiang MSA (2004) states that about seventy percent of 
total collisions in the Anhui section of the Yangtze River in two recent years are 
related to sailing cross areas. Thus decision-makers should consider reducing the 
number of such areas to a level as little as practicable or take measures to control and 
monitor the traffic flows in those areas. Besides six sailing cross areas, Wuhan Port 
has eighteen ferry lines that include thirteen for passengers and five for automobiles, 
connecting the two sides of the Yangtze River and the Hanjiang River. The total 
number of main traffic mixes in Wuhan Port can be approximately calculated as 
follows: 18 x 3 + 6 = 60.   
 
3.  A short introduction to visibility, current and wind in Wuhan Port 
 
The mean number of foggy days per year in Wuhan Port in the most recent five years 
is 33.1 days, ten of which happen most frequently in November. Commonly, fog 
forms in the morning and clears off by noon in the spring and winter. When fog is 
very thick above the surface of river, ferry services and other waterborne traffic will 
be suspended temporarily.  
 
Wuhan Port is predominated by East and South winds in spring and summer whereas 
West and North winds prevail in autumn and winter. The average wind speed is 2.8 
m/s and the wind force generally ranges from Beaufort Force (BF) 2 to 4 a year. The 
maximum wind speed in a year is commonly 19.1 m/s and an extreme 28 m/s of 
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strong gale was recorded once. There are on average 8.2 days for wind of BF above 7 
to 8 in the most recent five years and with 16 days being the highest. The average 
maximum current speed is 2.70 m/s yearly which always happens in the flood season 
with the highest on record being 3.06 m/s (MOC, 2001). However, current is slow 
where close to the banks of the river. The tidal current can only affect up to Nanjing 
Port and never reaches Wuhan Port due to the long distance (1125 km) from Wuhan 
to the Yangtze River Estuary.  
 
4.  Dangerous cargoes and marine pollution 
 
Wuhan Port has special wharves for dealing with dangerous cargoes including 
petroleum and chemical products. In 2004, the volume of freight handled for these 
cargoes reached 1.87 million tonnes. Meanwhile, many vessels carrying dangerous 
cargoes pass through Wuhan Port every year. With the developments in the Chinese 
economy, especially the littoral zones of the Yangtze River, the total freight volume 
in the Yangtze River ports has risen very rapidly. Figures 31 and 32 illustrate the 
change in the distribution of the main cargoes in Yangtze River ports in 1984 and in 
2003 (Xinhuanet, 2005). It is shown that in 2003, petroleum and chemical materials 
possessed a maximum proportion of the total freight volume instead of coal which 
got the largest share in 1984. Undoubtedly, Wuhan Port also has to confront the 
increased risks imposed by the sharply growing waterborne dangerous cargo 
transport along the Yangtze River.    
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Figure 31: Distribution of main cargoes in Yangtze River ports in 1984 
 
 
 
Source: Xinhuanet. (2005, January 12). Fast Increase in Freight Volume in Yangtze 
River’s Main Ports in the Recent Twenty Years. From the World Wide Web:                      
http://www.hb.xinhuanet.com/zhuanti/2005-01/12/content_3555086.htm 
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Figure 32: Distribution of main cargoes in Yangtze River ports in 2003 
 
 
Source: Xinhuanet. (2005, January 12). Fast Increase in Freight Volume in Yangtze 
River’s Main Ports in the Recent Twenty Years. From the World Wide Web:                      
http://www.hb.xinhuanet.com/zhuanti/2005-01/12/content_3555086.htm 
 
Wuhan Port is a river harbour along the Yangtze River, the biggest river in China, 
which is regarded as having very high sensitivity in terms of marine environment 
pollution. China has promulgated strict laws and regulations to prohibit any 
discharge of oil and oily mixtures from ships into the Yangtze River.  
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The port is attached to Wuhan City with more than 8 million residents, along the 
banks of which there are densely inhabited districts. The River is the main water 
source for drinking and industrial production in Wuhan. Many bird species build 
their nests on the beaches, while others regularly wander the shoreline searching for 
food. Aquatic mammals, such as white-fin dolphins, river suckling pigs and Chinese 
sturgeons, live in the River but they are close to extinction. Among them, white-fin 
dolphins are called living fossils and their total number is not beyond ten now in the 
world. In addition, the River and its shorelines also provide public recreation, such as 
fishing activities, swimming, boating, tourism and sightseeing. 
 
5.  Local geographical conditions 
 
Wuhan Port is located on the Yangtze River in the province of Hubei, 917 km from 
Wusong. The port’s location on the river means there is an extensive network of river 
transport links. The average width of channels in Wuhan Port is 570 m, where the 
maximum breadth is 1060 m and the minimum is 80 m in the Yangtze River section 
while the width of the Hanjiang River is about 60 m and the mouth to the Yangtze 
River is around 200 m. There are totally four bridges with 32 abutments in water 
crossing the Yangtze River and seven crossing the Hanjiang River in Wuhan port. 
The water level in the Yangtze River varies obviously according to the season. The 
draft limitation in the main channel is 4.5 m with a clean height of 26 m in the dry 
season and 8.0 m with a clean height of 24 m in the flood season.  
